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Legal scholars have devoted significant scholarly attention to
explaining why prosecutors reject postconviction evidence of innocence. 1
Indeed, some prosecutors have appealed postconviction defense motions
exhaustively—even in the face of forensic evidence of innocence—rather
than acknowledge a factual error.2 Yet, recent years have seen an undeniable
shift. Prosecutors have always had the authority, the ethical obligation, and
the investigative tools to identify false convictions.3 Now it seems that some
have the political will to remedy them as well. As of 2018, the National

1

See generally Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One’s Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel
Vision, 49 HOW. L.J. 475 (2006) (discussing prosecutors’ reticence to reevaluate convictions
even after evidence of guilt has been discredited); Alafair Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias:
An Invitation to Prosecutors, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 512 (2007) (arguing that prosecutors
resist acknowledging exculpatory DNA evidence because of cognitive biases rather than
ethical failures); Laurie L. Levenson, The Problem With Cynical Prosecutor’s Syndrome:
Rethinking A Prosecutor’s Role in Post-Conviction Cases, 20 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 335
(2015) (arguing that senior prosecutors become cynical about innocence claims); Daniel S.
Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence,
84 B.U. L. REV. 125 (2004) (discussing how the institutional culture of prosecutors’ offices
and political pressures encourage prosecutors to resist innocence claims); Aviva Orenstein,
Facing the Unfaceable: Dealing with Prosecutorial Denial in Postconviction Cases of Actual
Innocence, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 401 (2011) (arguing that a prosecutor’s self-perception as a
champion of justice leads to denial of exculpatory DNA evidence in the postconviction stage);
Hilary Ritter, It’s the Prosecution’s Story, but They’re Not Sticking to It: Applying Harmless
Error and Judicial Estoppel to Exculpatory Post-Conviction DNA Testing Cases, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 825 (2005) (discussing how some prosecutors would rather invent a new
theory of the crime rather than acknowledge errors discovered through postconviction DNA
testing); Keith Swisher, Prosecutorial Conflicts of Interest in Post-Conviction Practice, 41
HOFSTRA L. REV. 181 (2012) (describing the conflicts of interest that prosecutors experience
in revisiting their own prior convictions).
2
See, e.g., Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Discretion and PostConviction Evidence of Innocence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 467 (2009) (describing prosecutorial
opposition in the Palladium nightclub case resulting in two wrongful convictions); Orenstein,
supra note 1 (describing prosecutorial opposition in the cases of Wilton Dedge, Earl
Washington and William McCaffrey); Ritter, supra note 1 (describing prosecutorial
opposition in the case of Roy Criner); Swisher, supra note 1 (describing prosecutorial
opposition in the case of Ray Krone).
3
Ethical obligations for prosecutors’ postconviction behavior, developed by the American
Bar Association, stipulate that a prosecutor must “remedy the conviction” when the prosecutor
becomes aware of “clear and convincing evidence” demonstrating that the defendant did not
commit the offense. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018), htt
ps://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_
professionalconduct/rule38specialresponsibilitiesofaprosecutor/commentonrule38.html
[https://perma.cc/S7NP-MBGV]. In addition, the National District Attorney Association
(NDAA) has also issued postconviction standards, including the duty to “cooperate in postconviction discovery proceedings” and to notify the court and seek the release of the defendant
if the prosecutor “is satisfied that a convicted person is actually innocent.” NATIONAL
PROSECUTION STANDARDS, § 8, 1.7–1.8 (NAT’L DISTRICT ATT’Y ASS’N 2016).
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Registry of Exonerations (NRE) reported that a total of 344 exonerations had
been achieved with the assistance of Conviction Integrity Unit prosecutors.4
Conviction Integrity Units (CIUs), also commonly known as Conviction
Review Units (CRUs) among other titles, investigate claims of innocence and
wrongful conviction claims through a separate unit in the chief attorney’s
office.5 The rapid emergence of CIUs,6 and the hundreds of exonerations
that have followed, demonstrate this shift.
Scholars have welcomed the newly created CIUs;7 yet, aside from their
existence, little is known about them. Even less is known about prosecutors’
postconviction efforts outside the context of CIUs. What are the
circumstances that foster prosecutors’ assistance with exoneration? What

4
National Registry of Exoneration: Exonerations in 2018, NEWKIRK CTR. FOR SCI. AND
SOC’Y, app. tbl. A (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Document
s/Exonerations%20in%202018.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BSK-CW96]. The National Registry of
Exonerations is a project of the University of California Irvine Newkirk Center for Science &
Society, University of Michigan Law School, and Michigan State University College of Law.
5
See, e.g., the following CIU website statements of purpose: Bexar County, TX (“The
CIU will investigate claims of actual innocence or wrongful convictions by convicted
defendants who have already been through their trial and appeal processes”) Conviction
Integrity Unit, BEXAR COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY, www.bexar.org/1422/Conviction-Integ
rity-Unit [https://perma.cc/M49S-YFCH] (last visited Feb. 11, 2020); Salt Lake City, UT
(“The Conviction Review Unit (CRU) reviews and investigates post-conviction claims of
innocence and makes recommendations to the District Attorney about the disposition of those
claims.”) Salt Lake County District Attorney’s Office forms a Conviction Integrity Unit, SALT
LAKE CITY DISTRICT ATTORNEY, https://slco.org/district-attorney/conviction-integrity/ [https:
//perma.cc/9RAZ-N3JM] (last visited Feb. 11, 2020); Suffolk County, NY ( ”The Conviction
Integrity Bureau (“CIB”) aims to achieve and ensure justice by investigating claims of
innocence, remedying identified wrongful convictions, and providing proactive support and
recommendations to the Office to prevent wrongful convictions”) Conviction Integrity
Bureau, SUFFOLK COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY, https://suffolkcountyny.gov/da/About-the-Of
fice/Bureaus-and-Units/Conviction-Integrity-Bureau [https://perma.cc/YTA4-XXHN] (last
visited Feb 11, 2020).
6
NEWKIRK CTR. FOR SCI. AND SOC’Y, supra note 4. At the close of 2018, forty-four CIUs
had been created throughout the U.S. mostly in large, urban jurisdictions such as Dallas,
Houston, Brooklyn, Chicago, and Los Angeles. Id. at 2. The advent of CIUs appeared in 2002
and gained steadily in popularity since 2010. See id. at fig. 1.
7
See generally DANIEL S. MEDWED, PROSECUTORIAL COMPLEX: AMERICA’S RACE TO
CONVICT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INNOCENT 135 (2012) (“Taking a Fresh Look at Innocence:
The Case for Prosecutorial Innocence Units”); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., The Smart on Crime
Prosecutor, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 905, 911 (2012) (recognizing CIUs); Hon. Alex
Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, xxxi (2015) (advocating
for the creation of more conviction integrity units); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Enhancing the Justice
Mission in the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 343
(2010) (applauding the efforts of the Dallas County Conviction Integrity Unit).
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processes have prosecutors’ offices developed to uncover false convictions?8
How do they decide which innocence claims have merit? The answer to these
questions could enhance and encourage prosecutors’ postconviction
cooperation both within and outside the context of the CIU. It could
contribute to a more holistic understanding of the additional resources still
required to ensure the discovery of false convictions.
Therefore, the present study illuminates both CIU processes and the
efforts of prosecutors reviewing individual innocence claims. I conducted
semi-structured interviews with twenty prosecutors whose assistance had
been instrumental to a post-2005 exoneration and also with nineteen defense
attorneys who had worked with cooperative prosecutors on cases culminating
in exoneration since 2005. I asked these thirty-nine respondents about their
experiences and decision-making structures in specific exoneration cases as
well as their impressions of postconviction practices writ large.
I found that postconviction decisions—such as which prosecutor should
be tasked with reviewing innocence claims, how to screen and evaluate
innocence claims, and how to decide the outcome of a case—reflect decisionmaking at several levels. Using organizational accident theory,9 we can
conceptualize the following three levels: the top level of “the organization”
establishes the organizing principles for postconviction innocence review; in
this application it refers to the legal structure of the postconviction appeals
process established by the courts and lawmakers. These organizing
principles are then communicated through “the workplace”—the district
attorney and her executive team. The executive team establishes policies
reflective of the larger organization. Finally, there is “the worker”—the
individual prosecutor—who operates the machine. The worker’s decisions
are influenced and moderated by both the organization and the
management.10

8
By using the term “false conviction” rather than “wrongful conviction,” I mean to narrow
the focus of the discussion to actual innocence claims, as distinct from other types of
conviction error; for example, a procedural error. Although some conviction integrity units do
review these types of claims in addition to actual innocence claims, the present study
investigates only those false conviction claims based, at least in part, on actual innocence.
9
Organizational accident theory provides a systems approach to identifying and
correcting error. It attempts to look beyond individual actors to broader system failings that
may have contributed to the errors. See e.g., JON SHANE, LEARNING FROM ERROR IN POLICING:
A CASE STUDY IN ORGANIZATIONAL ACCIDENT THEORY (2013) (for an extended discussion of
the theory and how it has been applied to criminal justice system failings).
10
See JAMES REASON, MANAGING THE RISKS OF ORGANIZATIONAL ACCIDENTS 16 (1997)
(providing the concept for the hierarchical framework of the organization, the workplace, and
the worker).
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In the postconviction stage, executive-level decisions drive the
decision-making process. Unlike earlier-stage decisions—such as declining
to prosecute or dismissing a case pre-trial—the decision to dismiss a false
conviction remains at the discretion of the elected chief attorney.11
Furthermore, the line prosecutor’s decision to recommend exoneration
reflects executive decisions about how to process innocence claims. At the
same time, judicial and legislative decisions regarding the rules and
procedures of the postconviction stage influence both line prosecutor and
executive decisions.12 Teasing out these layers of decision-making is more
than a theoretical exercise. It carries implications for reforms of both policy
(in the crafting of legislation and court rules) and in practice (in the
processing of innocence claims through the prosecutor’s office).
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the legal
mechanisms for seeking relief from false conviction and places prosecutors’
role in reviewing postconviction innocence claims against the backdrop of
the failings of the postconviction appeals process for the actually innocent.
Part II describes the qualitative research methodology. Part III reports the
study findings according to a sequence of salient decisions marking an
innocence claim’s route through the prosecutor’s office. The sequence
begins with deciding how to route innocence claims through the prosecutor’s
office, next, how to screen them, and finally, how to make outcome decisions.
In each part, I demonstrate how individual prosecutors’ postconviction
decisions are informed and influenced by the office hierarchy and the
postconviction appellate system. Part IV concludes with a discussion of the
prosecutor’s role as a safeguard against false convictions as well as the policy
implications of these findings.

11
E.g., Ronald F. Wright, Prosecutor Institutions and Incentives, 18 CRIMINOLOGY CRIM.
JUST. L. & SOC’Y 85 (2017) (discussing the line prosecutor’s decision-making, including how
supervisors in large jurisdictions may have limited information about the case-level decisions
of their line staff).
12
Shawn Bushway & Brian Forst have developed a typology of discretion that captures
this dynamic. See Shawn D. Bushway & Brian Forst, Studying Discretion in the Processes
that Generate Criminal Justice Sanctions, 30 JUST. Q. 199, 201 (2013) (“The choice by
legislators to impose sentencing guidelines is an act of Type B discretion—the legally
allowable choice by judges of sentences within the sentencing guideline ranges is an act of
‘weak’ or Type A discretion. Type B discretion, the ability to create rules and policies, can be
used to limit and shape Type A discretion, and there is often a tension between the rules set
by actors (Type B) and the discretion available to lower level actors within those rules (Type
A).”).
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I. LEGAL MECHANISMS FOR SEEKING RELIEF FROM FALSE
CONVICTION
Much like other “high-risk fields”13 (e.g. business, medicine, aviation),
criminal justice system processes are complex and capable of producing
serious accidents. High-risk fields must, therefore, develop safeguards to
prevent and protect against accident. As James Doyle writes, criminal justice
system safeguards, or “screens” may include a “police supervisory screen, a
crime lab screen, a prosecutorial barrier, a grand jury process, an advisory
trial screen, and an appellate review screen.”14 The appellate process
operates as a late-stage safeguard against the possibility that accidents have
occurred but have not yet been discovered. CIUs have also been credited
with providing safeguards to correct false convictions15 even after they have
occurred. Although the question of the prevalence of false convictions
remains a subject of scholarly debate,16 it is generally agreed upon that not
all false convictions have been (or will ever be) discovered.17 After all,
criminal justice system accidents are less obvious than a plane crash, a market
crash, or a dead patient. As such, criminal justice system accidents may pass
undetected more readily than they do in other high-risk fields. Moreover,
overturning false convictions presents the risk of false exoneration—a false
negative.18 Further, in the pursuit of alternative suspects, attorneys risk
13
James M. Doyle, Orwell’s Elephant and the Etiology of Wrongful Convictions, 79 ALB.
L. REV. 895, 903 (2015).
14
JAMES M. DOYLE, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., LEARNING FROM ERROR IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM: SENTINEL EVENT REVIEWS, MENDING JUSTICE: SENTINEL EVENTS REVIEWS, A
SPECIAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE 3 (2014).
15
Id.
16
See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Overstating America’s Wrongful Conviction Rate:
Reassessing the Conventional Wisdom about the Prevalence of Wrongful Convictions, 60
ARIZ. L. REV. 815 (2018) (arguing that wrongful conviction scholars have exaggerated the
estimated rate of these types of errors); George C. Thomas, III, Where Have all the Innocents
Gone?, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. 865 (2018) (agreeing that previous estimates have been too high but
also arguing that Cassell underestimates the wrongful conviction rate) (in response).
17
See Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 through 2003, 95 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 533 (2005) (“a large number of false convictions in noncapital
cases are never even discovered because nobody ever seriously investigates these cases”); see
also Robert J. Ramsey & James Frank, Wrongful Conviction: Perceptions of Criminal Justice
Professionals Regarding the Frequency of Wrongful Conviction and the Extent of System
Errors, 53 CRIME & DELINQ. 436, 441 (2007) (writing that exonerations underestimate the
universe of wrongful convictions. “Most cases are the result of some serendipitous
circumstance wherein a wrongly convicted individual fortuitously happens to have his or her
case investigated by an individual or organization that champions their case and commits the
resources necessary to see that justice is done.”).
18
See Brian Forst, Managing Miscarriages of Justice from Victimization to Reintegration,
74 ALB. L. REV. 1209, 1212 n.8 (2010) (“Rigorous assessments of criminal justice policies
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producing a second false positive should the reinvestigation falsely accuse
an innocent person.19 Discovering and correcting organizational accidents in
the criminal justice system therefore presents unique complexities. It is
within this high-risk field of complexity that prosecutors’ offices improvise
systems for uncovering and correcting “accidents” of false convictions.
Prosecutors’ role in detecting false convictions can best be understood
against the backdrop of the failings of judicial review, for it is partly because
of appellate system inadequacy that falsely convicted defendants have taken
to prevailing upon prosecutors for relief.20 The legal scholarship suggests
that judicial review is ill-equipped to identify the factually innocent for at
least three reasons: 1) an overemphasis on procedural, rather than factual
errors; 2) belated review of new exculpatory evidence; and 3) an assumption
of judicial impartiality. This relationship between judicial postconviction
review and prosecutorial postconviction review demands a closer
examination than it has received in previous legal scholarship. Scholars have
suggested that prosecutors provide safeguards against false conviction not
otherwise available through judicial review.21 Therefore, I begin with an
overview of appellate failings before turning to a discussion of prosecutors’
postconviction responses to innocence claims, both supportive and
oppositional.
A. DETECTING PROCEDURAL ERRORS, NOT FACTUAL ONES

Findley and Scott aptly summarize the limitations of the appellate
review process, writing, “One of the most startling revelations to newcomers
to the justice system is that appeals have almost nothing to do with guilt or
innocence. Appellate courts, as a matter of principle, decide legal questions
and decisions explicitly weigh the relative costs of these errors, often referred to as false
positives (arrests and convictions of the innocent incarcerations of harmless people) and false
negatives (failures to convict culpable offenders or to incarcerate dangerous convicts). In any
given system, these two types of errors are often hydraulically linked, so that reducing one
produces an increase in the other. In other cases, new technology and methods arise that allow
for decreases in both errors simultaneously (DNA testing, more effective methods of
interrogation).”).
19
See Paul G. Cassell, Tradeoffs Between Wrongful Convictions and Wrongful Acquittals:
Understanding and Avoiding the Risks, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1435, 1447 (2018) (noting the
case of Anthony Porter and Alstory Simon, in which Simon was convicted of the crime after
Porter’s exoneration, and then Simon was also eventually exonerated).
20
See Fred C. Zacharias, The Role of Prosecutors in Serving Justice after Convictions, 58
VAND. L. REV. 171, 175 (2005) (“[O]nce appeals are complete, the prosecutor may be the only
participant in the criminal justice system in a position to rectify a wrong.”).
21
E.g., MEDWED, supra note 7, at 124 (“[A] prosecutor’s openness to an innocence claim
is vital to ensuring a full-fledged airing in court because of long-standing judicial and
legislative concerns about reexamining old cases.”).
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and focus on process, not the accuracy of factual determinations.”22
Historically, the purpose of the appeals process was not to remedy factual
errors (as clemency was intended to accomplish)23 but rather to correct
procedural ones.24
Judicial review often results in default findings of “harmless error” or
procedural justifications for denying the claim.25 Brandon Garrett’s study of
200 DNA exoneration cases found that courts reviewing the cases on appeal
often identified errors as harmless.26 The reversal rate for the DNA
exonerations—in which defendants had later been forensically cleared—was
indistinguishable from a matched comparison group of rape and murder
convictions.27 Put simply, the defendants later revealed to be actually
innocent were no more likely to receive relief than any other appellant.
Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to resolve the issue of
whether freestanding actual innocence claims based on newly discovered
evidence present sufficient legal justification for relief.28 In the paramount
case of Herrera v. Collins, the Court had an opportunity to state whether
actual innocence alone—in the absence of procedural errors—could ever
constitute sufficient legal grounds for relief. It neglected to do so.29

22

Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in
Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 348 (2006).
23
See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 391 (1993) (“History shows that executive
clemency is the traditional ‘fail safe’ remedy.”).
24
See Nancy J. King, Judicial Review: Appeals and Postconviction Proceedings, in
EXAMINING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS: STEPPING BACK, MOVING FORWARD 217 (Allison D.
Redlich et al. eds., 2014) (“A primary reason that judicial remedies have not provided a direct
path to relief for the wrongfully convicted is that they were never intended to serve this
purpose. Asking a judge to decide whether a conviction is factually accurate is like trying to
fit a square peg in a round hole.”).
25
Brandon L. Garrett, Patterns of Errors, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 287, 291 (2017) (“Today,
a wide range of procedural obstacles typically make it unnecessary for a judge to even reach
the question whether a claim has any merit. Harmless error rules lie below many layers of
procedural sediment.”).
26
Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 107–08 (2008).
27
See id. at 127 (finding a 14% reversal rate among the 200 cases, which excluding death
penalty reversals, becomes 9%, statistically insignificant difference from that in the
comparison group).
28
See Paige Kaneb, Innocence Presumed: A New Analysis of Innocence as a
Constitutional Claim, 50 CAL. W.L. REV. 171, 186 (2014) (discussing Herrera v. Collins and
writing, “[t]he court, without reaching the question of whether innocence is a valid
constitutional claim, held that Herrera was not entitled to relief.” Kaneb also argues that
Herrera’s case was “far from ideal for innocence” and that a stronger claim may have
compelled the court to consider the question of whether innocence poses a freestanding claim
for federal habeas review).
29
See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 418–19 (1993).

2020]

HOW PROSECUTORS ASSIST WITH EXONERATION

253

Herrera’s petition, which was denied, introduced new evidence in the form
of informant affidavits and did not raise procedural errors.30 The decision
reinforces the legal primacy of procedural fairness over factual accuracy.
Still, the Herrera ruling does not preclude state courts from recognizing
newly discovered evidence of innocence as a valid basis for a postconviction
claim, and many of them do.31 State caselaw and statutes often provide legal
mechanisms for relief on newly discovered evidence of innocence alone,
without also requiring a procedural grievance or a constitutional violation.32
These remedies have their own shortcomings. Brooks and colleagues’
survey of state laws finds many to be DNA-centric and to set a high legal
standard for relief that puts the burden on the defendant to effectively
establish his own innocence.33 Nancy King adds that many states have
limited actual innocence legal remedies for certain types of defendants,
“barring defendants whose persuasive proof of innocence is not DNA
evidence, or defendants who pleaded guilty rather than going to trial.”34
Therefore, falsely convicted defendants may rely upon trial errors—
improper jury instructions, prosecutors’ inflammatory statements, or
ineffective assistance of counsel—to receive relief, but this strategy can

30
Id. at 416–17 (“[I]n state criminal proceedings the trial is the paramount event for
determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Federal habeas review of state convictions
has traditionally been limited to claims of constitutional violations occurring in the course of
the underlying state criminal proceedings. Our federal habeas cases have treated claims of
‘actual innocence,’ not as an independent constitutional claim, but as a basis upon which a
habeas petitioner may have an independent constitutional claim considered on the merits, even
though his habeas petition would otherwise be regarded as successive or abusive. History
shows that the traditional remedy for claims of innocence based on new evidence, discovered
too late in the day to file a new trial motion, has been executive clemency.”).
31
See Justin Brooks et al., If Hindsight Is 20/20, Our Justice System Should Not Be Blind
to New Evidence of Innocence: A Survey of Post-Conviction New Evidence Statutes and a
Proposed Model, 79 ALB. L. REV. 1045, 1078 (2015) (recognizing states such as California,
Connecticut, Illinois, New Mexico and New York which “have explicitly recognized the right
to a freestanding claim of actual innocence” and noting that still other states treat postconviction newly discovered evidence claims as synonymous to actual innocence claims);
John M. Leventhal, A Survey of Federal and State Courts’ Approaches To A Constitutional
Right Of Actual Innocence: Is There A Need For A State Constitutional Right In New York In
The Aftermath Of CPL § 440.10(G-1), 76 ALB. L. REV. 1453, 1477 (2012) (discussing the
states that recognize “freestanding claims of actual innocence” and the limitations of these
measures, including Illinois, Missouri, New Mexico, and Maryland).
32
See generally Leventhal, supra note 31.
33
See Brooks et al., supra note 31, at 1054 (“Unfortunately, many of the changes to the
criminal justice system and proposed legislation dealing with new evidence focus in large part
on DNA test results.”).
34
Nancy J. King, Appeals, in 3 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE 253, 270 (Erik Luna ed.,
2017).
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preclude the possibility of ever establishing their factual innocence.35
Indeed, some prosecutors have been faulted for ignoring the issue of actual
innocence altogether by offering defendants some other form of relief in
exchange for their freedom. This often takes the form of an Alford plea, in
which the defendant maintains his innocence but accepts that the prosecution
has enough evidence to retry the case.36 Relief on procedural grounds cannot
compare to exoneration as a remedy for the falsely convicted. The defendant
will not be eligible for compensation;37 and the system will have
mischaracterized the true nature of the error. Most importantly, the defendant
will not be publicly vindicated and may not be recognized as factually
innocent by his community and the general public.
B. BELATED REVIEW OF NEW EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE

In most states, after a brief window when defendants can file for a new
trial, new evidence of innocence will not be considered until defendants have
completed their direct appeal and entered the postconviction stage.38 This
process can take years, meaning that only those serving lengthy prison
sentences can avail themselves of the remedy.39 In addition, most states do
not provide indigent defendants with an attorney in the postconviction
stage.40 Without legal advocacy and expertise, and lacking the ability to
35

See King, supra note 24, at 224–25.
See Megan Rose, What Does an Innocent Man Have to Do to Go Free? Plead Guilty,
PROPUBLICA, Sept. 7, 2017, https://www.propublica.org/article/what-does-an-innocent-manhave-to-do-alford-plea-guilty [https://perma.cc/CG5K-EUMS] (detailing the ProPublica and
The Atlantic investigation of cases in Baltimore City and County in which defendants with
innocence claims accepted postconviction plea deals).
37
See Elizabeth Griffiths & Michael Owens, Remedying Wrongful Convictions: Societal
Obligations to Exonerees, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS: STEPPING BACK, MOVING FORWARD
267, 270 (A.D. Redlich et al. eds., 2014) (noting that statutory compensation schemes often
require forensic evidence of innocence or gubernatorial pardons). See generally Evan
Mandery et al., Criminology: Compensation Statutes and Post-Exoneration Offending, 103 J
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 553 (2013) (providing overview of the importance of compensation
in rehabilitating the wrongfully convicted).
38
See Daniel Medwed, Up the River Without a Procedure: Innocent Prisoners and Newly
Discovered Non-DNA Evidence in State Courts, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 655, 676 (2005) (“First,
many time limits governing motions for a new trial on the grounds of newly discovered
evidence are remarkably brief. As a result, these remedies are of limited utility to the bulk of
criminal defendants who, in the immediate aftermath of their convictions, might not have the
resources or the good fortune to find new evidence.”).
39
See King, supra note 24, at 220 (reporting that the mean custodial sentence for state
felony offenders is three years, “barely long enough to complete the appellate process”).
40
See Keith Findley, Innocence Protection in the Appellate Process, 93 MARQ. L. REV.
591, 605 (2009) (“While most states have statutes permitting motions for a new trial based on
newly discovered evidence, or permitting challenges to fact-based constitutional claims such
36
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investigate from behind bars, filing pro se leaves indigent prisoners at a
considerable disadvantage.41 Yet, in the postconviction stage, most
claimants have no alternative. Release may provide more opportunities for
investigation and more financial opportunities to retain counsel, but these
advantages are undermined by the defendant’s limited access to judicial
review after incarceration.42 Despite evidence of the myriad injurious effects
of a criminal record,43 courts tend to overlook the need for relief after a
custodial sentence has been served.44
C. ASSUMPTION OF IMPARTIALITY

Claims in the postconviction stage—a defendant’s first meaningful
opportunity to present new evidence—are typically sent first to the trial court
and reviewed by the trial judge who originally handled the case.45 This
as ineffective assistance or Brady claims, those proceedings are almost always collateral
proceedings; they are not a part of the direct appeal process. As such, they usually come after
the direct appeal, after the defendant has served significant time or even the full sentence in
prison, and, most importantly, after the defendant no longer has a right to the assistance of
counsel to present those claims.” Findley further notes that death penalty cases prove an
exception to this general rule.).
41
See BRANDON GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
GO WRONG 195 (2011) (writing “[m]ost pro se petitioners simply don’t stand a chance”).
42
See King, supra note 24, at 220 (“In federal court and in just over half of the states,
postconviction review is limited to prisoners who are still incarcerated or on parole after their
direct appeals have been completed.”).
43
See generally ALEXES HARRIS, A POUND OF FLESH: MONETARY SANCTIONS AS
PUNISHMENT FOR THE POOR (2016) (documenting how poor defendants suffer from nearly
insurmountable financial obstacles through court-imposed monetary sanctions); DEVAH
PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS INCARCERATION
(2007) (finding that criminal record holders, especially black men, experience employment
discrimination); Alessandro Corda, More Justice and Less Harm: Reinventing Access to
Criminal History Records, 60 HOW. L.J. 1 (2016) (arguing that public access to criminal
records fosters an “enduring stigma” for record holders that leads to loss of opportunities);
Sarah E. Lageson & Shadd Maruna, Digital Degradation: Stigma Management in the Internet
Age, 20 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 113 (2017) (discussing the prevalence of online criminal
records and their damaging effects to personal reputation); Elizabeth Westrope, Employment
Discrimination on the Basis of Criminal History: Why an Anti-Discrimination Statute is a
Necessary Remedy, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 367 (2018) (discussing the failure of
current remedies such as expungement statutes to prevent the employment discrimination that
criminal record holders face).
44
See King, supra note 24, at 220.
45
See Medwed, supra note 38, at 699 (writing that “many new trial motions and postconviction petitions premised on newly discovered non-DNA evidence are directed to the trial
judge who handled the case originally”). Medwed also notes that habeas corpus petitions may
be filed in the county of conviction or the county of confinement. Id.; see also King, supra
note 24, at 220 (reporting that the postconviction petition for relief is filed in the trial court
where petitioner was convicted).
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system prioritizes efficiency over accuracy. The trial judge will be familiar
with the case. She may use her existing knowledge of the case to evaluate
the credibility of the claim. This knowledge could be especially useful in
cases involving recanting witnesses. The disadvantage of such a practice is
that the trial judge has a “vested interest” in denying that the conviction is
flawed.46 The legal process assumes that judges maintain impartiality despite
their involvement in the original trial.
However, research into judicial decision-making and cognitive biases
calls this assumption into question. Findley and Scott’s analysis of cognitive
bias in appellate review describes the influence of “outcome bias” and
“hindsight bias.”47 They write: “the outcome of the case—conviction—tends
to appear, in hindsight, to have been both inevitable and a ‘good’ decision.”48
This may apply to judicial review in general49 and one would expect it may
apply to the original trial judge in particular. Judges, being human, may
struggle to accept evidence that their earlier assessment was flawed.50 They
may naturally ascribe a higher value to their own decision-making skills and
“perceive themselves as fair individuals who, in the main, render or oversee
correct decisions.”51
By the time most defendants get the opportunity to introduce new
evidence of innocence, the assertion of their guilt has been argued,
established, and finalized on direct appeal. Judges have professional
incentives to avoid opening up new legal inroads to flimsy postconviction
innocence claims. Indeed, finality has legitimate benefits for crime victims
and witnesses, for juries, and for courts.52 Victims need closure, and
46
Medwed, supra note 38, at 659–60 (“Even more, motions seeking relief on the grounds
of new evidence are often filed with the original trial judge, a person who may have a vested
interest in the outcome, and that judge’s decision normally receives tremendous deference on
appeal.”).
47
Findley & Scott, supra note 22, at 319–20.
48
Id. at 320.
49
See id. at 320, 348 (writing “[h]indsight bias and outcome bias have particularly serious
implications for appellate and postconviction review by judges” and “[n]ormative tunnel
vision does not end after conviction; it intensifies as cases proceed through appellate and
postconviction litigation.”).
50
See generally THOMAS GILOVICH, HOW WE KNOW WHAT ISN’T SO: THE FALLIBILITY OF
HUMAN REASON IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1991) (examining human tendencies to draw conclusions
based on what we expect to see and what we want to see).
51
Medwed, supra note 38, at 701.
52
See Laurie L. Levenson, Searching for Injustice: The Challenge of Postconviction
Discovery, Investigation, and Litigation, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 545, 552 (2014) (discussing the
balance between accuracy and finality and exploring the legitimate interests in preserving
finality); David Wolitz, Innocence Commissions and the Future of Post-Conviction Review,
52 ARIZ. L. REV. 1027, 1054 (2010) (“Taking Finality Seriously”).
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witnesses need assurance that they will not be badgered into recanting their
testimony by convicted defendants and their family members.53 Juries may
take their trial obligations more seriously when they believe that the verdict
will stand.54 Courts, with limited resources and “newer and more pressing
matters,” simply cannot prioritize postconviction review.55 After direct
appeal, the system is invested in maintaining the conviction and expending
few (if any) resources on continued litigation.56 Postconviction procedural
rules reveal an “institutional bias in favor of preserving convictions at all
costs” that applies on both the state and federal level.57
This abiding interest in the principle of finality stands in direct tension
with the need for factual accuracy. To use a term from the organizational
accident literature, case finality confers “productive advantages.”58 The need
to deliver the final product is balanced against the importance of protection
against accidents.59 Applied to the appellate context, the need to deliver
finality must be weighed against the risk of failing to identify a false
conviction.60 Historically, the appellate system has tipped the scales in favor
of finality.61
D. THE PROSECUTOR AS A PATHWAY TO EXONERATION

Amidst this dearth of options for falsely convicted defendants,
prosecutors have the power and the potential to provide an additional

53

See generally SERI IRAZOLA ET AL., STUDY OF VICTIM EXPERIENCES OF WRONGFUL
CONVICTION (2013) (describing victims’ rights legislation with a duty to protect victims from
the accused), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/244084.pdf [perma.cc/ZUW47UU5].
54
See Wolitz, supra note 52, at 1056 (“The idea here is that the system needs to invest
some decision-maker(s)—namely, the trial judge and jury—with sufficient final authority to
impress upon them the weight of their responsibility. Any increase in the ability of the litigants
to reopen the case post-trial necessarily diminishes the trial court’s authority and thus
undermines its sense of responsibility.”).
55
Id. at 1055 (“Any incremental increase in review adds to already overwhelmed dockets
of courts, increases expenses, and takes away resources from adjudication of newer and more
pressing matters.”).
56
See Leventhal, supra note 31, at 1466 (writing about federal courts’ reluctance to
consider freestanding innocence claims).
57
Stephanie Roberts Hartung, Post-Conviction Procedure: The Next Frontier in
Innocence Reform, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION 247, 252 (Daniel
S. Medwed ed., 2017).
58
See REASON, supra note 10, at 6.
59
See id.
60
See id. at 4 (discussing the relationship between production and protection).
61
See Laurie L. Levenson, supra note 52, at 551 (“The criminal justice system is obsessed
with finality.”).
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safeguard. Through their quasi-judicial role62 and their accountability “to
seek justice within the bounds of the law, not merely to convict,”63
prosecutors have both the opportunity and the incentive to facilitate
exoneration in false conviction cases. Moreover, a variety of developments
may arise that would compel the prosecutor’s proactive review: They may
become aware of new exculpatory evidence of innocence in a case (for
example, when an alternate suspect confesses); they may identify defects in
evidence submitted in pursuit of a previous conviction; or new technological
developments may necessitate case review.64 Although prosecutors lack the
authority to unilaterally release convicted defendants, they can bring a
motion to vacate the judgement and order a new trial through the courts.
Provided that the court grants the motion, prosecutors can then move to
dismiss the case.65
Legal and empirical research suggests that most prosecutors are
typically unwilling to take this step. In Gould and Leo’s study of 260
wrongful conviction cases, prosecutors were found to have “played a
significant role” in only 9% of the exonerations.66 The authors write that
prosecutors “remain entrenched in a highly adversarial mindset in the postconviction exoneration process.”67 In Brandon Garrett’s study of 200 DNA
exonerations, he finds that in at least seventy-one (36%) of the cases,
defendants had to apply for a court order for DNA testing “absent willing
cooperation of law enforcement.”68 A study of prosecutorial assistance
among the exoneration cases listed by the NRE found that only 32% of
prosecutors sought to help overturn the false conviction.69 In sum, the
62
See generally Stanley Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual
Framework, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 197 (1988) (discussing the prosecutor’s dual quasi-judicial
and adversarial roles).
63
AM. BAR ASS’N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION:
STANDARD 3-1.2 “FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES OF THE PROSECUTOR,” https://www.americanbar.or
g/groups/criminal_justice/standards/ProsecutionFunctionFourthEdition/
[https://perma.cc/P7RV-AA6J].
64
See Zacharias, supra note 20, at 176 (exploring the question “When are Prosecutors’
Postconviction Justice Obligations Implicated?”).
65
See generally id. at 185 (describing procedural process in detail).
66
Jon B. Gould & Richard A. Leo, The Path to Exoneration, 79 ALB. L. REV. 325, 344
(2015) (defining “significant role” as indicating that the prosecutors “engaged in substantial
investigation or advocacy,” which surpasses simply not opposing defense motions. The
authors also report that prosecutors opposed 10% of the exoneration cases.).
67
Id. at 332.
68
Garrett, supra note 26, at 119.
69
See Elizabeth Webster, A Postconviction Mentality: Prosecutorial Assistance in
Exoneration Cases, 36 JUST. Q. 323, 333 (2019) (“Prosecutors provided some level of
assistance with the exoneration in 32.5% or 524 of the 1,610 cases in the sample.”).
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prosecutor’s modal response to postconviction innocence claims appears to
be either resistance or ambivalence.
Legal scholarship featuring case studies of prosecutors’ responses to
innocence claims supports this empirical evidence. Prosecutors’ denial of
factual error, even in the face of dispositive evidence of innocence, has been
a source of fascination for legal scholars.70 Research explores how some
prosecutors have undermined efforts to uncover errors and refused to
acknowledge those that do surface.
Prosecutors’ resistance to
acknowledging factual errors has been attributed to both psychological
bias71—similar to that experienced by reviewing judges—and to institutional
pressures.72
Postconviction claims often involve allegations of wrongdoing on the
part of defense attorneys or prosecutors,73 since petitioners are limited in their
ability to make these types of claims on direct appeal.74 New evidence of
70

See generally Bandes, supra note 1 (discussing the effect prosecutorial tunnel vision
can have on wrongful convictions); Burke, supra note 1 (reviewing the problem of
prosecutor’s cognitive bias in postconviction proceedings and inviting prosecutors to make
modest reforms to combat these biases); Levenson, supra note 1 (focusing on the fact that
senior prosecutors, and not young prosecutors, are more likely to resist exonerations);
Medwed, supra note 1 (reviewing the political and organizational barriers that lead many
prosecutors to ignore postconviction allegations of innocence); Orenstein, supra note 1
(reviewing how and why prosecutors resist allowing DNA testing and deny the obvious
implications of DNA evidence when that evidence exonerates the convicted); Ritter, supra
note 1 (examining the court’s potential use of harmless error and judicial estoppel to prevent
prosecutors from creating a new theory of the crime when the results of postconviction DNA
testing undermine the theory upon which a defendant was convicted); Swisher, supra note 1
(analyzing the ways prosecutorial review of postconviction cases causes conflicts of interest
and suggestions of reform).
71
See Bandes, supra note 1; Burke, supra note 1; Alafair Burke, Improving Prosecutorial
Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1632–
33 (2006).
72
See Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
309, 353 (2001) (discussing the conviction mentality that stems from “politics, institutional
pressures, adversarialness, self-righteousness, and arrogance”); Medwed, supra note 1, at
134–38 (exploring “[p]rofessional [i]ncentives to [o]btain and [m]aintain [c]onvictions”);
Swisher, supra note 1, at 202–04 (describing prosecutors’ “[u]nhealthy [f]ear of [c]ivil
[l]iability”).
73
See Levenson, supra note 52, at 572 (“It is not enough to argue that the petitioner may
be innocent. Petitioners and their counsel must engage in the equivalent of thermal nuclear
habeas warfare to succeed. The net result is a distorted, exaggerated practice where petitioners
are more likely to argue that every prosecutor is a Brady cheater, every defense lawyer
provides ineffective assistance of counsel, and every police officer is dismissive of
exculpatory evidence.”)
74
See King, supra note 34, at 258 (explaining how direct appeal does not review claims
like ineffective assistance of counsel or the state’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence,
both of which are common contributors to wrongful conviction).
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innocence may include material, exculpatory evidence that was withheld
from the defense in violation of Brady v. Maryland.75 Of those DNA
exonerees in Garrett’s study bringing postconviction claims, the most
successful raised ineffective assistance of counsel (29%) or allegations that
prosecutors had withheld exculpatory evidence (16%).76 Brady violations
could be the result of intentional misconduct or the inadvertent oversight of
an overworked prosecutor.77 In either case, prosecutors would be
understandably reticent to expose such an error, particularly if they would be
the one held responsible for it. In extreme cases, they may fear being sued
or that their office may be sued.78 More likely, they may fear inviting
professional reprisal and disciplinary sanction.79
Institutional pressures may also discourage prosecutors from
objectively considering postconviction innocence claims. The “new
prosecutor’s dilemma”80 lies in discovering innocent defendants amidst a sea
of guilty petitioners. Prosecutors, overwhelmed by the volume of
postconviction motions, may become jaded to the possibility of innocence.81
As a percentage of the prison population, relatively few defendants ever file
postconviction motions, but this still translates to a large number of claims
received.82 Daniel Medwed identifies a prosecutor’s “needle in a haystack
disincentive,” writing, “Not only might a prosecutor be more dubious about
the legitimacy of a specific motion given the quantity of comparable papers,
but the sheer volume also makes it harder to isolate the meritorious claims,
75

373 U.S. 83, 91 (1963).
Garrett, supra note 26, at 96 (see “Table 5: Criminal Procedure Claims Raised by
Exonerees”).
77
See Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive
Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261, 263 (2011)
(“[M]any prosecutors are asked to commit malpractice on a daily basis by handling far more
cases than any lawyer can competently manage.”).
78
See Swisher, supra note 1, at 202–04 (describing prosecutors’ “[u]nhealthy [f]ear of
[c]ivil [l]iability”); Zacharias, supra note 20, at 218 (discussing “[t]he range of conflicts of
interest”).
79
See generally Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial
Accountability, 157 PENN. L. REV. 960, 975–79 (2009) (discussing American Bar Association
Rules of conduct and disciplinary sanctions—though acknowledging that these are rarely
enforced—as well as internal office hiring and firing practices).
80
Dana Carver Boehm, The New Prosecutor’s Dilemma: Prosecutorial Ethics and the
Evaluation of Actual Innocence, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 613, 620–23 (2014) (stating that the
ethical obligations for prosecutors in the face of new postconviction exonerations have not
been updated).
81
MEDWED, supra note 7, at 127 (“The last thing prosecutors want is to encourage
prisoners to bury them with marginal innocence claims.”).
82
See Nancy J. King et al., Habeas Litigation in the U.S. District Courts, (Vand. U. Law
Scho. Legal Stud. Research Paper No. 07-21, 2007).
76
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even for the prosecutor predisposed to hunt for them.”83 Requests for
postconviction DNA-testing have allowed some innocence claims to
transcend the haystack. Yet, in the twilight of the DNA era, innocence claims
may increasingly hinge on non-DNA evidence,84 such as witness
recantations, confessions of alternate suspects, and less probative forms of
forensic evidence.
Prosecutors’ disinclination to reconsider innocence claims—and in
some cases, their outright and dogged opposition to these claims—can prove
insurmountable for defendants. Prosecutors enjoy broad postconviction
discretion,85 and defendants are unlikely to prevail if the prosecutors oppose
postconviction relief.86 On the other hand, when prosecutors facilitate an
exoneration, they can provide an alternative safeguard for falsely convicted
defendants when the appellate system fails. For example, prosecutors’
support for postconviction forensic testing or evidentiary hearings in a case
may help persuade judges to grant defendants’ requests.87 In addition,
prosecutors’ access to law enforcement resources might facilitate
reinvestigations.
As CIUs have emerged, scholars have observed and welcomed them88
as the “best chance”89 for systematically identifying false convictions and as
a “smart on crime”90 criminal justice reform. Several district attorneys and
CIU chiefs have published articles describing their own processes,91 and
83

Medwed, supra note 1, at 149.
See Medwed, supra note 38, at 657–58 (describing the difficulty of achieving
exoneration with non-DNA evidence).
85
See Zacharias, supra note 20, at 173 (“[P]rosecutorial discretion is at its height in the
postconviction context”)
86
See Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 2, at 486–87 (“A court is more likely to grant
relief if a prosecutor joins in a defendant’s motion to set aside his conviction based on new
evidence . . . Conversely, it would be exceedingly difficult to prevail over the prosecutors’
opposition either in court or in the executive mansion.”).
87
See Daniel Medwed, The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice, 84 WASH. L. REV. 35, 37
(2009) (“A key variable, then, in the ability of a criminal defendant to have a chance for
success on a post-conviction claim of innocence often lies in the nature of the prosecutor’s
response; prosecutorial openness to the possibility of the defendant’s innocence may go a long
way toward convincing the judge of the merits of that claim, if only to the extent of granting
an evidentiary hearing.”).
88
See NEWKIRK CTR. FOR SCI. & SOC’Y, U. CAL. IRVINE, supra note 4, at 12 (noting the
“important” role of CIUs in 2018 exonerations and writing “[a]s the number of CIUs increases,
we may see more exonerations secured by cooperation of IOs [innocence organizations] and
CIUs”).
89
Kozinski, supra note 7 (advocating for the creation of more conviction integrity units).
90
Fairfax, Jr., supra note 7, at 911.
91
E.g., Ingrid H. Chandler, Conviction Integrity Review Units: Owning the Past,
Changing the Future, 31 CRIM. JUST. 14 (2016) (describing the Conviction Integrity Review
84
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these tend to emphasize unit successes as well as prosecutors’ postconviction
ethical obligations. Scholarly research of CIUs includes articles exploring
best practices,92 case studies analyzing a small subset of individual units,93
and overviews providing details about the number and existence of CIUs. 94
Much of this research offers guidelines for CIUs in case reinvestigation,
discovery-related concerns, working with police departments and defense
attorneys, developing standards of review, training prosecutors, and more.95
The most comprehensive of its kind, “Conviction Review Units: A
National Review,”96 surveyed and interviewed nineteen CRUs and issued a
series of recommendations, including independence from the appellate units,
the ability to report directly to the district attorney, and the flexibility to allow

Unit of Harris County, Texas); Cyrus R. Jr. Vance, The Conscience and Culture of a
Prosecutor, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 629 (2013) (describing the formation and goals of the New
York County District Attorney’s Conviction Integrity Program); Mike Ware, Dallas County
Conviction Integrity Unit and the Importance of Getting It Right the First Time, 56 N.Y. L.
SCH. L. REV. 1033 (2012) (describing the Dallas County Conviction Integrity Unit).
92
E.g., Barry C. Scheck, Conviction Integrity Units Revisited, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 705
(2016) (reviewing recently created conviction integrity units across the country) [hereinafter
Scheck, Conviction Integrity Units Revisited]; Barry C. Scheck, Professional and Conviction
Integrity Programs: Why We need Them, Why They Will Work, and Models for Creating
Them, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2215 (2010) (creating a framework to consider for the
development of Professional Integrity and Conviction Integrity units) [hereinafter Scheck,
Professional and Conviction Integrity Programs].
93
E.g., Boehm, supra note 80 (reporting on case studies of CIUs in five offices); see also
ESTABLISHING CONVICTION INTEGRITY PROGRAMS, NYU LAW CENTER ON THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE REPORT, http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_
documents/Establishing_Conviction_Integrity_Programs_FinalReport_ecm_pro_073583.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2RQ3-FXNL] (focusing on Manhattan DA office and Santa Clara County’s
CIU).
94
E.g., National Registry of Exonerations: Exonerations in 2017, NEWKIRK CTR. FOR SCI.
& SOC’Y, U. CAL. IRVINE (2018), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents
/ExonerationsIn2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/YP6K-VXDE] (finding that there were thirty-three
Conviction Integrity Units operating nationally in 2017); NEWKIRK CTR. FOR SCI. & SOC’Y, U.
CAL. IRVINE, supra note 4, (finding forty-four CIUs in existence in 2018); Daniel Kroepsch,
Prosecutorial Best Practices Committees and Conviction Integrity Units: How Internal
Programs Are Fulfilling the Prosecutor’s Duty to Serve Justice, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1095 (2016) (outlining the growth of Conviction Integrity Units from emergence in 2002
through 2016).
95
E.g., Boehm, supra note 80; JOHN HOLLWAY, CONVICTION REVIEW UNITS: A NATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE, FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP AT PA. L. 1 (2016), https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2615&context=faculty_scholarship [https://perma.cc/27EC-3NA
W]; Kroepsch, supra note 94; Scheck, Professional and Conviction Integrity Programs, supra
note 92; Scheck, Conviction Integrity Units Revisited, supra note 92.
96
Hollway, supra note 95.
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for broad case selection criteria, among others.97 Above all, the report
advocates for independence, flexibility, and transparency of prosecutorial
practices.98 The report endeavors to provide guidelines for CRUs operating
in good faith, observing that bad faith efforts—dubbed CRINOs (Conviction
Review In Name Only), or “conviction preservation units”99—can be worse
than no CRU at all for the threat that they pose to the legitimacy of sincere
efforts in other jurisdictions.
The Innocence Project has also developed guidelines for CIUs based on
the experiences of innocence organizations collaborating with such units
across the country.100 These include detailed recommendations for case
intake and selection, investigation, staffing, reporting results, and learning
from errors.101 Barry Scheck provides additional commentary on these
guidelines, addressing several potential CIU pitfalls.102 For example, he
writes: “Some prosecutors may be tempted to send all post-conviction
matters that involve constitutional claims, such as Brady violations or
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, to their appeals unit even if the
petitioner or their counsel raise ‘plausible’ claims of innocence and request a
CIU investigation.”103 What is the source of this temptation for prosecutors?
Perhaps prosecutors are tempted to assume that courts can handle
postconviction cases that involve constitutional claims and therefore such
cases don’t require CIU attention. Perhaps they are reluctant to review
allegations of intentional and unintentional misconduct that may arise in the
context of a Brady violation or ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Whatever the case may be, Scheck’s commentary highlights the relevance of
the office appeals unit and its relationship to the CIU.
Beyond these few studies, scholarship has not kept pace with the rapid
emergence of CIUs or examined their significance for prosecutorial
discretion. Research investigating the assistance of prosecutors reviewing
innocence claims outside the context of a CIU has not yet appeared. Even
those who advocate for CIUs concede that it is impractical in most small

97

Id. The report’s recommendations, issued in four categories, include: Independence,
Flexibility, Transparency and Prevention.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 19 n.25.
100
INNOCENCE PROJECT: CONVICTION INTEGRITY UNIT BEST PRACTICES 2, 4 (2015),
https://www.innocenceproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Conviction-Integrity-Unit.pd
f [https://perma.cc/Q876-39EV].
101
Id.
102
Scheck, Conviction Integrity Units Revisited, supra note 92, at 720–46.
103
Id. at 727.
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jurisdictions to create such a unit.104 Approximately 74% of prosecutors’
offices serve a population of fewer than 100,000 people.105 A broader
understanding of postconviction innocence review therefore depends upon
examining processes in smaller and medium-sized jurisdictions as well.
However, the difficulty of accessing prosecutors’ offices presents
obstacles to conducting this type of research. Green and Yaroshefsky
describe a lack of transparency regarding postconviction processes:
Certainly, there have been many reported cases in which prosecutors learned of new
evidence, investigated or failed to investigate, and made or opposed efforts to secure
the defendant’s release . . . But because prosecutors’ internal processes are not
transparent, very little is known about the internal deliberations and rationales for what
prosecutors have done.106

Even with increased scrutiny on prosecutors’ postconviction decisionmaking and with the creation of best practices in CIU jurisdictions, this lack
of transparency remains an obstacle for researchers and for the general
public. The NRE has documented its attempts to reach CIUs in thirty-three
of the jurisdictions where a CIU has been implemented.107 They found that
ten of the units had no website and were also inaccessible by phone.108 The
report concludes:
As a result, it appears that these units are not, as a practical matter, accessible to the
public at large. In particular, innocent criminal defendants and concerned family
members who seek exoneration are not likely to be able to present their cases to these
CIUs unless they can afford to hire lawyers.109

Discovering factual errors matters for the falsely convicted, and it
matters for a system that wishes to learn from its errors. However, the
“marginalization of factual error,”110 the slow pace of justice, the denial of
indigent postconviction defense counsel, and the assumption of judicial
104

See Hollway, supra note 95, at 21 (“It should be noted, though, that many smaller state
or local prosecutors’ offices may lack the resources to separately staff a CRU.”).
105
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2007- STATISTICAL
TABLES, NATIONAL CENSUS OF STATE COURT PROSECUTORS (2007), https://www.bjs.gov/cont
ent/pub/pdf/psc07st.pdf [https://perma.cc/K32S-N82Z].
106
Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 2, at 481.
107
NEWKIRK CTR. FOR SCI. & SOC’Y, U. CAL. IRVINE, supra note 94, at 14–15.
108
See id.
109
NEWKIRK CTR. FOR SCI. & SOC’Y, U. CAL. IRVINE, supra note 94, at app. tbl. A; see
also NEWKIRK CTR. FOR SCI. & SOC’Y, U. CAL. IRVINE, supra note 4, at app. tbl. A, (providing
a similar table, which reports that thirteen of the now forty-four CIUs do not have web
addresses).
110
DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 212
(2012) (noting that court rulings reveal a prioritization of bureaucratic considerations “over
the protections against false verdicts”).
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impartiality undermine appellate review remedies.111
Furthermore,
112
prosecutors do not appear to fill the “error correction gap” left by appellate
shortcomings.113 While prosecutors have the potential to identify and rectify
false convictions (and in some jurisdictions they have the demonstrated track
record as well), research suggests that a variety of professional and
psychological disincentives conspire to discourage prosecutors from doing
so.114
With this context, I now turn to the methodology.
II. METHODOLOGY
To explore this understudied area, I conducted semi-structured
interviews with nineteen defense attorneys and twenty prosecutors. In
speaking directly with attorneys engaged in exoneration cases I hoped to
develop an understanding of how prosecutors assist in the project of
identifying and correcting false convictions, how they make decisions about
individual cases, how they determine the practices that enable them to make
those decisions, what challenges they face, and what more might yet be done.
In this part, I explain the interview methodology and research design; I
describe characteristics of the respondents, eligibility for participation, and
interview questions; and I explore the strengths and limitations of the
methods.
Attorneys represented nineteen states and thirty-six unique jurisdictions
and include sixteen women and four persons of color.115 All but two
respondents had ten years or more of experience as criminal attorneys. Three
of the defense attorneys and six of the prosecutors formerly served as
opposing counsel. A trend among some urban jurisdictions has been to select
a former defense attorney to head the CIU.116 In this sample, such CIU heads
count as prosecutors. Similarly, some defense attorney respondents had
accrued more years of experience as prosecutors. For ease of discussion,
these two categories of “defense attorney” and “prosecuting attorney” are
rendered static, though some respondents brought a variety of experiences on

111

See supra Section I.A–I.C.
King, supra note 34, at 270.
113
See supra Section I.D.
114
See supra Section I.D.
115
Defense attorneys are counted according to the county in which their client was
exonerated. Most defense attorneys represented clients by state or region, handling cases
outside their home jurisdiction.
116
See Scheck, Conviction Integrity Units Revisited, supra note 92, at 738–40 (discussing
staffing recommendations for CIUs).
112
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both sides of the courtroom to bear. See Tables 1 and 2 for additional
prosecutor and defense attorney characteristics.
Table 1: Prosecutor Respondents (N=20) (Response Rate = 50%)
Race
White
Non-White
Gender
Male
Female
Type
Private
Public
Innocence Org

17
2
10
9
5
6
8

Career Stage as an Attorney
Early (< 10 years)
Mid (10 > 20 years)
Late (> 20 years)
Geographic Region
Northeast
Midwest
South
West
Experience as opposing counsel
Yes
No

2
8
9
6
4
6
3
3
16

Table 2: Defense Attorney Respondents (N=19) (Response Rate = 86%)
Race
White
Non-White
Gender
Male
Female
Type
Elected District Attorney
Appellate Attorney
Supervising Trial Attorney
CIU
Experience as Opposing Counsel
Yes
No

18
2
13
7
5
2
4
9
6
14

Career Stage as an Attorney
Early (< 10 years)
Mid (10 > 20 years)
Late (> 20 years)
Retired
No longer a prosecutor
Geographic Region
Northeast
Midwest
South
West
Jurisdiction Size
Small (< 500k)
Medium (500k > 1 mil)
Large (> 1 mi)

0
10
7
1
2
5
5
6
4
3
7
10

To be eligible for the study, defense attorney respondents must have
served as one of the chief postconviction attorneys on an exoneration case
that featured some level of assistance from prosecutors. Prosecuting attorney
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respondents must have assisted defense counsel or else proactively facilitated
or supported an exoneration. Exoneration cases and attorneys were identified
through the NRE, an online, open-source registry. The NRE tracks U.S.
cases since 1989, the year of the first DNA exoneration.117 Only those
exoneration cases since 2005 were considered in order to avoid problems
with retrospective reinterpretation and also to better capture recent
exoneration processes. Narrative case profiles are provided for each case
listed by the NRE, and attorney respondents were culled from these profiles.
When attorney names were not included in the case profile, background legal
and media research was conducted to determine the actors involved. Contact
information for individual attorneys, or an attorney’s assistant, was then
accessed online.
Determinations about whether or not prosecutors had assisted with the
exoneration were based on any one of a number of supportive actions, for
example: joining in a defense motion to vacate the conviction, reinvestigating
a troubled conviction, requesting postconviction forensic testing, and
more.118 I reviewed these case profiles as well as non-public NRE data about
the prosecutor’s role in 1,610 state-based exonerations to determine the
prosecutor’s actions in each case. Whenever necessary, I supplemented this
information by researching news articles and legal documents online. Details
117

THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS: GLOSSARY, https://www.law.umich.edu/
special/exoneration/Pages/glossary.aspx [https://perma.cc/86QZ-6V5Z] (last visited Nov. 2,
2019) (explaining that exonerations come about in a variety of ways: through a pardon or
certificate of innocence, an acquittal on retrial, a posthumous exoneration, or, most commonly,
the prosecution or judge’s decision to dismiss charges postconviction). When highly probative
material evidence like DNA exists, the defendant may receive a pardon based on innocence.
Conversely, the exoneration may take the form of an acquittal at retrial. In these cases,
prosecutors pursued a new conviction, but the new evidence of innocence sufficiently
convinced the jury of reasonable doubt. Id. The NRE definition of “exoneration” depends
upon evidence of innocence, but not upon an explicit declaration of innocence. The NRE does
not claim to know whether every exonerated person listed is factually innocent. Id.; see also
SAMUEL R. GROSS & MICHAEL SHAFFER, EXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 1989–2012:
REPORT BY THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS 6 (2012), https://www.law.umich.edu/
special/exoneration/Documents/exonerations_us_1989_2012_full_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DP6B-DWTX] (In defining exoneration, Gross and Shaffer explain that they
“do not claim to be able to determine the guilt or innocence of convicted defendants,” because
“in difficult cases, nobody can do that reliably.”).
118
Other supportive actions include recommending that the case be dismissed or that the
defendant be pardoned, publicly asserting belief in the defendant’s innocence or apologizing,
assisting or supporting the conviction review efforts of other government officers, and
pursuing postconviction evidence of innocence and sharing this evidence with defense soon
after discovery. In some cases, prosecutors’ supportive actions were undermined by resistance
or opposition. When the available evidence suggested that prosecutors obstructed the path to
exoneration, then the prosecutor was not considered to have assisted in that case. More
detailed information is available from the author upon request.
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of the litigation were not always discoverable; determinations were made
based on the available information. In total, 524 cases were determined to
have involved some degree of prosecutorial assistance. Narrowing the
sample to those exonerations since 2005 resulted in 330 exoneration cases
through which attorney respondents would be considered eligible for this
study.
Case selection was further narrowed to avoid over-sampling of
attorneys from any one state. Over half of the eligible cases (177 of 330)
came from just three states: Texas, New York, and Illinois. I sought variety
so as to avoid overemphasizing legal practices and statutory idiosyncrasies
peculiar to specific states. I also avoided over-sampling attorneys who had
worked on DNA exoneration cases since decision-making processes in these
cases may follow a similar pattern (culminating in forensic evidence of
innocence).
I intentionally did not select attorneys who worked together on the same
exoneration case. Though this design would have strengthened internal
validity by triangulating information through at least two participants, it
would also have undermined efforts to guarantee confidentiality since
respondents could easily discover that their counterpart on the case had also
been interviewed. Furthermore, sourcing a wider variety of jurisdictions
enhances external validity while also permitting prosecutors who have
assisted with an exoneration independently—or with minimal involvement
from the defense—to be included in the sample. Finally, selecting only pairs
of attorneys may have introduced a selection bias towards compatible,
cooperative relationships since attorneys may be less willing to speak
critically of their counterpart if that individual was also being interviewed.
Interviews were conducted between April 2016 and November 2018.
Whenever possible, I made arrangements to conduct these interviews in
person; however, given the national scope of the study, most interviews were
conducted over the phone.119 All but one of these interviews (which was
documented by typewritten notes at the respondent’s request) were audio
recorded and transcribed soon after the recording. Defense attorney and
prosecutor interviews were conducted concurrently. Statements made by
each group informed an evolving understanding of the other.
The average interview length was eighty-four minutes. Each of the two
semi-structured interview guides (one for prosecutors and one for defense

119
In total, twelve of the defense attorneys and four of the prosecuting attorneys were
interviewed in person. The rest were conducted over the phone.
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attorneys) 120 began by referencing a specific case experience. These
questions generated responses about the step-by-step process leading to the
exoneration. For example, questions probed how prosecutors initially
became aware of the innocence claim, the nature of the communication
between prosecutors and defense attorneys, and the elected prosecutor’s role
in the exoneration case. The interview then elicited details about
participants’ postconviction experiences beyond that individual case,
specifically, the criteria that the office used to decide how to respond to
postconviction evidence of innocence, and the processes involved in
decision-making as cases progressed from intake to review to resolution.
Additionally, prosecutors were asked to recall a case that had not culminated
in exoneration, and defense attorneys were asked to share experiences
working on cases in which prosecutors had not agreed to relief.
Though all attorneys could speak broadly about their practices and
experiences in the postconviction stage, not all of them chose to provide
details about a specific exoneration case. Some attorneys spoke in more
general terms out of confidentiality concerns, out of caution about potential
civil litigation involving the exonerated defendant, or because they preferred
to reference a larger set of exoneration cases (for example, all those handled
by the CIU). See Table 3 for case characteristics of the twenty-eight cases
for which detailed information was provided.

120
Interview guides are available from the author upon request. The defense attorney
guide contains thirty-nine questions and the prosecutor guide contains forty-three. These
guides are intended to be exhaustive so that they might anticipate all of the various types of
cases and processes under discussion. For example, prosecutor guides include a separate set
of questions for CIU prosecutors (“About how many cases has the CIU reviewed?”) and also
for non-CIU prosecutors (“Does your office have a procedure for investigating claims of actual
innocence?”). Not every question applies to every respondent. Moreover, time constraints of
some respondents precluded the opportunity to answer every question. Rather, a grounded
theory style of interviewing is “open-ended yet directed, shaped yet emergent, and paced yet
unrestricted.” See KATHY CHARMAZ, CONSTRUCTING GROUNDED THEORY 85 (2d ed. 2014).
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Table 3. Exoneration Cases (N = 29)
Defendant Race
White
Black
Hispanic/ Other
Defendant Gender
Male
Female
Defendant Prior Criminal History
No
Yes
Unknown
Case Disposition
Plea
Trial
Offense
Murder
Sexual Assault
Other
Year Exonerated
2005 – 2009
2010 – present

11
16
2
29
0

1
26
2
5
24
14
9
6
6
23

Exonerating Evidence*
DNA
Non-DNA Forensic
New witness
Recantation
Alt suspect identified
Other
Postconviction Review
Type
CIU
CIU + Innocence Org
Innocence Org
Other
Geographic Region
Northeast
Midwest
South
West
Jurisdiction Size
Small (< 500k)
Medium (500k > 1 mil)
Large (> 1 mi)

12
9
3
8
5
6

2
5
10
12
6
8
11
4
8
9
12

* Will Not Total to 29
A. STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS

Existing research reflects an interest in official prosecutor-led efforts,
such as CIUs, thus overlooking smaller, more episodic efforts.121 The current
study samples purposively according to attorney affiliation, seeking
respondents working out of official exoneration shops—such as innocence
organizations and CIUs—but also those responding to individual innocence
claims. Gathering a range of perspectives and experiences from attorneys in
different-sized jurisdictions results in a broader range of practices to assess
and to generate postconviction innocence review models for other
jurisdictions. The current study seeks to establish a broad understanding of

121
See generally Boehm, supra note 80; Hollway, supra note 95, at 1; Kroepsch, supra
note 94; Scheck, Professional and Conviction Integrity Programs, supra note 92; Scheck,
Conviction Integrity Units Revisited, supra note 92; NEWKIRK CTR. FOR SCI. & SOC’Y, U. CAL.
IRVINE, supra note 94; NEWKIRK CTR. FOR SCI. & SOC’Y, U. CAL. IRVINE, supra note 4.
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the advantages and pitfalls of different processes so that practitioners might
learn from their counterparts in similarly situated jurisdictions. During this
time of CIU adoption and innovation, the desire to develop best practices
must be moderated by the risk of pushing prosecutors’ offices into the same
mold. The present study seeks to recognize diversity, thus resisting “a
generic portrait of prosecution.”122
The study design offers three points of comparison: between
prosecuting attorney respondents and defense attorney respondents, among
prosecuting attorneys, and among defense attorneys. These multiple points
of comparison allow for an examination of the similarities and differences in
the unique types of postconviction actions, processes, and practices
employed in the postconviction arena by public, private, and innocence
organization attorneys and also by CIU chiefs, elected prosecutors, and line
prosecutors. This study analyzes how defense attorneys describe successful
postconviction collaborations compared to how prosecutors envision them.
Prosecutor respondents may naturally wish to emphasize strengths and
minimize shortcomings when describing their work and decision-making.
Defense attorneys’ responses can provide additional context. For example,
defense attorneys’ explanations of the hierarchical constraints that
prosecutors face provided valuable insights that would not have emerged
from the prosecutor interviews alone. Perhaps prosecutor respondents
hesitated to question the internal policies established by their superiors.
Therefore, defense attorney perspectives helped contribute a multidimensional view of postconviction innocence review processes. Though
prosecutor and defense attorney respondents did not work together on the
same exoneration case, they were able to reference the same types of
processes. Defense attorneys described their perceptions from the outside
looking in, while the prosecutors provided a subjective internal view. These
different perspectives contributed a more balanced accounting.
The research endeavor was aided by the use of “grounded theory”
methods.123 The researcher applying grounded theory develops tentative
“sensitizing concepts”124 in advance that may be based on existing theories
and scholarship, but also allows new concepts to emerge through data

122
Ronald Wright et al., The Many Faces of Prosecution, 1 STAN. J. CRIM. L. & POL’Y
REV. 27, 27 (2014).
123
See generally CHARMAZ, supra note 120, at 85 (providing more information about
grounded theory methods).
124
HERBERT BLUMER, SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM: PERSPECTIVE AND METHOD 147
(1969).
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collection.125 Grounded theory requires an inductive, iterative process of
simultaneous data collection and analysis “to make early stops to analyze
what you find along your path.”126 The grounded theory style of intensive
interviewing works to provide a positive experience for the interviewee and
to close the interview on a positive note.127 Speaking about positive
examples of the postconviction process helped put respondents at ease and
encouraged open-ended responses.
The study takes a broad-brush approach to exploring a nascent area of
research. These findings represent a first step in understanding prosecutors’
postconviction processes and decisions but only among those prosecutors
who have already demonstrated a willingness to help overturn false
convictions. It does not illuminate the decision-making, motivations, or
postconviction practices of prosecutors who have never assisted with an
exoneration case. Nevertheless, by initiating the inquiry with this subset of
responsive prosecutors, we are then free to evaluate the efficacy of practices
that might be assumed to represent the very best of prosecutors’
postconviction efforts to remedy false convictions.
However, when an exoneration escapes attention—as many surely do—
the prosecution’s efforts cannot be taken into account. NRE Exoneration
cases selected may vary from the larger universe of all exoneration cases in
non-random ways. The NRE compiles cases when either 1) new
exonerations appear in the news and are publicized by legal advocacy groups,
or 2) low-profile exoneration cases that have not been publicized are
discovered by NRE researchers through internet media research, legal
research, or outreach to public officials. Jurisdictions do not maintain
systematic records of exonerations. For this reason, the dataset may overrepresent those cases from jurisdictions that better publicize exonerations, as
well as those capturing the attention of the media and of innocence
organizations.128 Exonerations represent a small sample of false conviction
125

See generally BARNEY G. GLASER & ANSELM L. STRAUSS, THE DISCOVERY OF
GROUNDED THEORY: STRATEGIES FOR QUALITATIVE RESEARCH (1967) (developing grounded
theory methods of qualitative data collection and analysis).
126
CHARMAZ, supra note 120, at 1 (describing how grounded theory methods incorporate
initial coding and focused coding of the qualitative data).
127
See id. at 70.
128
See Samuel R. Gross, What We Think, What We Know and What We Think We Know
About False Convictions, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 753, 761 (2017) (“With no practical way to
identify exonerations from official records, most of the ones we know about are those that get
substantial attention in the media and on the internet. That’s unlikely to happen if the
participants are not interested in attention or actively seek to avoid it. For many exonerations,
avoiding attention may be a goal of all of the professional participants in the case: police,
prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys.”).
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cases, and the NRE does not discover every exoneration. Nevertheless, it
represents the most comprehensive and reliable source of exoneration data
presently available.
The low response rate among prosecutors requires further explanation
as well. While a handful of respondents were known to me through
professional contacts, most were recruited “cold,” resulting in a response rate
of 86% for defense attorneys (nineteen of twenty-two contacted) and 50%
(twenty of forty contacted) for prosecutors.129 The low response rate for
prosecutors may illustrate a selection bias. These results cannot be
generalized to all prosecutors, or even all prosecutors assisting with
exoneration claims. Instead, findings represent that subset of prosecutors
who not only have assisted, but were also willing to talk about their
postconviction processes at length. They might, therefore, be more receptive
to innocence claims than the average prosecutor. They may also be more
experienced or at least enjoy enough “vertical autonomy”130 to agree to an
interview without requiring their supervisors’ permission. Of the twenty
prosecuting attorney respondents interviewed, eleven were assistant district
attorneys who made recommendations about a case for their superiors to
decide, four were veterans reporting directly to the elected district attorneys,
and five described experiences as the elected district attorneys.
The need to obtain the approval of supervisors may have prevented
some prosecutors from participating in the study. Some who suggested
interest explained that they would need to clear it with their boss first or “run
it up the chain.” Communication often ceased after that. None of the defense
attorney respondents—whether innocence organization attorneys, public
defenders, or private attorneys—mentioned needing to check with their boss
first.131 Therefore, line prosecutors at the lowest levels of the office hierarchy
are underrepresented in this study. Insights about line prosecutors’

129
Low response rate for prosecutors is not inconsistent with previous studies. See
Ramsey & Frank, supra note 17, at 448 (reporting a 47% response rate for prosecutors
responding to a survey that asked for estimates of the false conviction error rate); Marvin
Zalman et al., Officials’ Estimates of the Incidence of ‘Actual Innocence’ Convictions, 25
JUST. Q. 72, 82 (2008) (reporting 28% response rate among Michigan prosecutors and a 47%
response rate among Ohio prosecutors).
130
Kay L. Levine & Ronald F. Wright, Prosecution in 3-D, 102 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1119, 1147 (2013) (“By vertical autonomy, we mean the degree of
independence each prosecutor feels from his boss (or supervisor) when it comes to making
decisions on his own cases.”).
131
A few of these defense attorney respondents were known to me through professional
relationships forged in my former position at the Innocence Project. Nevertheless, like
prosecutor respondents, the majority were recruited without any previous contact or referral.
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postconviction role in innocence review was supplemented by the many
defense attorney respondents who had worked with these prosecutors.
III. FINDINGS
In reporting the findings, I follow the route that an innocence claim
takes through the prosecutor’s office, highlighting a series of salient
decisions: 1) which individual, or which unit, will be tasked with reviewing
postconviction innocence claims; 2) how cases will be screened and
evaluated upon arrival; and 3) how outcome decisions will be made (e.g.
whether the case will be dismissed, the innocence claim denied, or some
other form of relief will be granted). I take each in sequential order and
describe how several levels of discretion shape these decisions.
A. SELECTING THE PROSECUTOR TASKED WITH INNOCENCE
REVIEW

Whether a district attorney is responding to a single wrongful conviction
claim or proactively interested in reviewing a set of claims, her first step will
be to decide who should be tasked with the review. Will the district attorney
seek to create a CIU, or direct innocence claims to an existing appellate
division, the original trial prosecutor, or someone else? Such decisions
necessarily involve the district attorney’s vision for how the review process
should be conducted. With the exception of those jurisdictions that have
publicly announced creation of a CIU, little is known about how prosecutors’
offices receive innocence claims.132
Among the prosecutor respondents, some believed that innocence
claims should be reviewed in the appellate division, while others argued that
they should be distinguished as a separate type of claim entirely.133 The
prosecutors represented here have all already demonstrated a willingness to
remedy false convictions; therefore, we might reasonably expect
postconviction processes in these offices to be more successful at identifying
errors than those in the typical prosecutor’s office. Most prosecutor
respondents reported that innocence claims in their office were routed either

132

See Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 2, at 494 (“Little information is publicly
available about how prosecutors’ offices respond, because little, if any, of their internal
processes is exposed to public view.”).
133
To protect respondents’ confidentiality, all interviewees have been assigned a number
and will be designated by this number in direct quotes. When prosecutors are referenced, but
not quoted, the citation omits interviewee numbers in the interests of confidentiality.
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to CIUs (N=10)134 or to appeals divisions (N=4).135 CIU attorneys, and the
defense attorneys who worked with them, regularly contrasted the CIU
approach with the appeals approach. While these two structures dominated,
prosecutors working outside of either CIU or appeals revealed a variety of
alternative approaches. Among the six remaining prosecutors’ offices (those
who did not follow either CIUs or appellate divisions to review innocence
claims), two routed innocence claims to the original trial prosecutor, two to
a veteran member of the executive team, and in two offices they went directly
to the district attorney.136
1. Conviction Integrity Units
The nine prosecutors working in CIUs offered a variety of explanations
for why the district attorney had established their CIUs: a desire for “good
community juju”137 (or fostering community goodwill), to keep pace with a
neighboring jurisdiction, in response to a high-profile exoneration, in
response to new legislation,138 or in response to an increase in actual
innocence claims from the defense bar. The development of the CIU,
therefore, adapted to a shifting legal landscape, marked by new expectations
of prosecutors from the public, legislators, and defense attorneys. CIUs are
a recent phenomenon, only emerging in the last fifteen years;139 due to their
novelty, chief prosecutors, or the CIU attorneys they appointed, described
processes of establishing the CIU shape and structure. Nearly every CIU

134
Some CIUs did not handle innocence claims exclusively but also routinely reviewed
traditional appellate claims. For the purposes of categorization, if the office had established a
CIU, it is counted as such, even if CIU attorneys also handled appeals or if their innocence
review work was only part-time.
135
Because some interviews were conducted with upper management who spoke about
innocence claims as handled by a staff attorney, these numbers will not always correspond
with the type of attorney interviewed. Rather, district attorneys and members of the executive
team reported on standard office practices.
136
Defense attorney respondents shared a wide variety of experiences working with CIUs,
appeals, original trial prosecutors, supervising trial prosecutors, and elected district attorneys.
137
Interview with Prosecutor 6 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with author).
138
For example, a district attorney may wish to create a conviction integrity unit in
response to the passage of a postconviction new evidence statute in their state, which could
facilitate defendants’ ability to file postconviction legal challenges, thus increasing the volume
of innocence claims.
139
NEWKIRK CTR. FOR SCI. & SOC’Y, U. CAL. IRVINE, supra note 4, at fig. 1, (reporting
“Number of Conviction Integrity Units in Operation by Year”). This figure charts the first CIU
in 2003, with a steady incline beginning in 2009.
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attorney described an adjustment period in establishing protocols.140 One
referred to her CIU as a “work in progress.”141
About half of the defense attorney respondents could share experiences
working directly with a CIU (or even multiple CIUs) or in collaboration with
prosecutors just prior to the establishment of the CIU. Three defense
attorneys who had ongoing relationships with a CIU observed the same
work-in-progress element of its evolution, or as one innocence organization
attorney put it, “they have significant growing pains.”142 Two others believed
that the creation of the CIU had not changed much about how the office
conducted postconviction business, either because the office conducted
legitimate innocence review already (“I can’t believe there’s that much
difference, they’re just calling it ‘integrity’”143), or because they believed that
the unit was a CRINO. A few defense attorney respondents called out the
hypocrisy of offices that they believed had created a CRINO for political
purposes (“It’s not real. It doesn’t exist, they just say they have it.”)144
Nevertheless, most defense attorneys acknowledged a qualitative difference
in the CIU approach, or at least, a genuine attempt to approach innocence
claims differently. For example, one public defense attorney offered
qualified praise: “Here, within a relatively short period of time . . . . there
were actual innocent people getting out. As much as we say we’d like more
to have been done, no other district attorney’s office in the state would have
done what they did.”145
As reflected in this defense attorney’s statement, some respondents
cited exonerations as proof of a CIU’s success. At the same time, as we will
see, the distinction between CIU review and more traditional postconviction
review was often spoken about more in terms of mindset than of process or
outcome. In particular, CIU prosecutors and defense attorney respondents
distinguished the CIU approach from the appeals approach.

140
I describe any respondent prosecutor working in a CIU as a “CIU attorney” or “CIU
prosecutor.” However, in practice, some of these prosecutors balanced a mixed caseload
including more traditional appeals as well.
141
Interview with Prosecutor 33 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
142
Interview with Defense Attorney 36 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
143
Interview with Defense Attorney 2 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
144
Interview with Defense Attorney 7 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
145
Interview with Defense Attorney 12 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
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2. Appellate Divisions
Half of the prosecutor respondents did not have a CIU in their office,
though their offices may have been large enough to accommodate such a unit.
Two of the prosecutors expressed doubts that their office needed any largescale conviction review because of its strong history146 or reputation.147 Two
others believed resources were better allocated towards the front end,
preventing false convictions.148 The four prosecutors working in offices
where appellate divisions handled their innocence claims believed that
appeals served that function already and that establishing a CIU would
merely duplicate existing efforts.149
Attorneys in different jurisdictions referred to the division as “appeals,”
“postconviction review,” “PCR,” “habeas,” or “writs.” CIU prosecutors and
defense attorneys regularly characterized the work of appellate prosecutors
to be at cross purposes with innocence review. The exact terms of the interoffice relationship between CIU prosecutors and appellate prosecutors
emerged as a theme in interviews with these respondents. For example, when
I asked a CIU attorney to imagine the appeals division in her office playing
a larger role in innocence review, she said, “It’s a great idea. Is it a realistic
idea? Maybe at some point in the future, but I don’t think we’re going to get
there for a long time. Appellate prosecutors are trained so differently . . . It’s
almost like this huge cognitive bias.” She added:
People talk in terms of appellate lawyers go in with a presumption that the conviction
is valid. They don’t go in with a presumption, they go in with absolute confidence . . .
. . . They see a conviction, and there’s not going to be, “Oh, this person may not be
guilty.” They’re going to say: “This person is guilty.”150

146
Interview with Prosecutor 17 (“I think that’s a decision that the elected DAs have to
make when they look at their office and what their history is, and whether it is needed. I don’t
know if it is needed everywhere, but . . . if the public for some reason is having some issues
with decisions by the elected DA and her assistants, then maybe it’s a good idea to have
someone give a little oversight. I don’t think it is necessarily required.”) (confidential
unpublished interview) (on file with author).
147
Interview with Prosecutor 34 (“That’s part of our job. I don’t need a conviction
integrity unit to do that. I think our record speaks for itself.”) (confidential unpublished
interview) (on file with author).
148
E.g., Interview with Prosecutor 19 (“I think we’ve come in on the front end, we have
things in place to prevent that from happening[.]”) (confidential unpublished interview) (on
file with author); Interview with Prosecutor 20 (“I think the more fertile ground is not
conviction review units but prosecution integrity units. That is to make sure that we are going
forward against the right person.”) (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with author).
149
Appeals can also be handled externally by the Attorney General’s office. Among
respondents, three stated that at least some appellate claims were handled externally.
150
Interview with Prosecutor 5 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with author).
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This CIU attorney suggests that prosecutors accustomed to appellate
review approach postconviction innocence review with a fundamentally
different mindset. Rather than consider the innocence claim on its merits,
they identify procedural reasons (or “procedural landmines” as they were
described by one innocence organization attorney)151 to justify rejecting it.152
As for the suggestion that individual appellate prosecutors experience
cognitive bias, an appellate prosecutor responded to this suggestion:
At the end of the day I have the same interest as anybody else does. I don’t want the
wrong person in jail, nor do I want the actual killer out on the street. So, I mean, I care
about my cases and I care about what goes on with them . . . . And at some point, you
have more knowledge of the case than a traditional person. Some of my cases…I’ve
been involved for over ten years. I mean, you can’t replace that. But, of course, by the
same token, somebody could say, “Oh, you looked at it for ten years, you’re jaded by
that.” And I would disagree only knowing who I am. I’m not built that way.153

While this prosecutor asserts his own impartiality, he simultaneously
raises the source of his potential bias. Having already reviewed previous
versions of the defendant’s appeal, he has “more knowledge,” but his
knowledge stems from having rejected the appeal in the past.
Other CIU prosecutors spoke not of cognitive biases, but rather of rigid
adherence to the adversarial nature of appellate procedure. From this
perspective, appellate prosecutors’ myopic behavior could be characterized
without value judgment. One described the attitude of the appeals division
in her office as “How can I make this claim go away? How can I defeat this
claim? How can I stand by the conviction?”154 Another explained: “You
don’t have a [CIU] actually just kind of being an appellate unit or habeas
unit. They need to be distinct to look at different things a little bit more

151

Interview with Defense Attorney 1 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
152
For example, arguing that the evidence of innocence could have been discoverable at
the time of trial. An innocence organization attorney explained: “When we’re talking about
new evidence of innocence that wasn’t considered previously, there’s a lot of emphasis on,
‘Well, it’s new, but couldn’t you have found this earlier?’ That kind of thing . . . . The only
reason it wouldn’t have been brought out earlier is because you had a bad attorney. Otherwise
somebody would have brought it out, or else it wasn’t find-able, one or the other. Either way,
why should the person continue sitting in prison if either of those two happened?” Interview
with Defense Attorney 4 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with author); see also
Brooks et al., supra note 31, at 1050 (providing more on how this appellate strategy fails
innocent defendants).
153
Interview with Prosecutor 21 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
154
Interview with Prosecutor 6 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with author).
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holistically.”155 A third CIU prosecutor pointed to appellate deadlines,
raising the possibility that appellate prosecutors may not have time to “look
at different things a little bit more holistically.” She explained:
In some ways, I think it would be nice to be able to transition to an environment where
Post-Conviction was cognizant of a lot of the same things that CIU does and had the
ability to look at something a little harder. But they’ve got timetables and
deadlines . . . we have more time to work on them.156

Several defense attorney respondents also acknowledged the daily
realities of the appeals division in a prosecutor’s office. For example, an
innocence organization attorney said of appellate prosecutors, “They get
thousands of postconviction petitions by prisoners. Most of them are
frivolous. They’re trying to find procedural ways to make them go away.
That’s the main thing that they do.”157
Furthermore, several prosecutor respondents characterized appeals as
an undesirable assignment. One appellate prosecutor said, “I try to explain
to my friends what I really do. It’s like ‘so you do what? You’re looking at
what? These are old cases? Who cares about these things?’”158 Another
confessed, “I was actually hired under the no-whining clause. I had to agree
to do appeals without whining for two years—without wanting to do trial
work.”159 This common preference for trial work was substantiated when I
asked a prosecutor who works in trials whether he had ever worked in
appeals, and he responded, “No, thank goodness.”160
Such comments suggest that appellate prosecutors’ work is not regarded
in the office as exciting or rewarding. Rather, appellate prosecutors are
professionally socialized to “defeat the claim” and make it “go away.”161
From this perspective, their rejection of innocence claims is less about
psychological bias and more about meeting the demands of the appellate
structure and schedule and responding to the expectations of their superiors.

155
Interview with Prosecutor 26 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
156
Interview with Prosecutor 37 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
157
Interview with Defense Attorney 4 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
158
Interview with Prosecutor 21 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
159
Interview with Prosecutor 32 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
160
Interview with Prosecutor 22 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
161
See supra note 135 and accompanying discussion.
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If the goal of the appellate unit is to find legal arguments to undermine
the appeal and maintain the conviction, then the CIU stands in direct contrast.
The stated goal of the CIU is to identify and correct false convictions.162
While CIU and defense attorneys accepted that these two units should serve
separate functions, the case review processes that they described revealed
complications in implementing this separation. Such complications included
difficulty transitioning cases between units and difficulty establishing the
hierarchy of leadership between appeals and CIU.
First, CIU prosecutors and defense attorney respondents spoke about the
challenges of negotiating workflow between CIU and appellate divisions.
When CIUs are first established, certain categories of postconviction
innocence claims may be rerouted from appellate units to the new CIU. In
some offices, the CIU is developed as an extension of the appellate division.
Two CIU prosecutors said that they continued to handle other types of
postconviction claims, such as habeas petitions. The main distinction is that
traditional postconviction claims would be processed through the courts,
whereas a CIU would also regularly handle claims out of court by working
directly with defendants and their counsel. A defense attorney respondent
reported that the CIU attorneys in her jurisdiction brought their appellate
caseload with them when they transferred to the CIU. (CIU teams, including
the chief prosecutor of the unit, were often culled from appellate divisions.)
Respondents also described the opposite scenario, in which the appellate unit
had retained some types of postconviction innocence claims even after the
implementation of the CIU. For defense attorneys, such seemingly
bureaucratic decisions could portend the outcome of a claim. As an
innocence organization attorney lamented, “I have a case that went to the
appeals unit, and they’re opposing us. Whereas if it had gone to the new
[CIU], we would have a much better chance and opportunity.”163 This
inability to redirect her client’s case to the newly established CIU ultimately
led her to conclude that she would have to continue to pursue the appeal, and
then submit it to the CIU if it failed in litigation.
Difficulty transitioning cases between units endured after the CIU
implementation as well. In large jurisdictions with fully staffed CIUs,
postconviction claims were maintained on a separate track. CIU prosecutors
spoke of sending rejected innocence claims to the postconviction section but
rarely of having received claims from postconviction. Advocating for a
separation between the two units, prosecutors expressed concern for
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See supra note 5.
Interview with Defense Attorney 3 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
163
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duplicating each other’s work. Two CIU prosecutors explained that they
would not, as a matter of office policy, consider claims that were
simultaneously under review on appeal. For example:
We have a requirement that if your case is currently on appeal or currently in habeas,
that we won’t look at it because you’re essentially splitting your office by having some
people looking at it with the possibility of vacating a conviction while you have other
people looking at it to uphold a conviction.164

Meanwhile, the second CIU prosecutor voiced concern about this policy
because “you don’t want to wait until it’s too late. You don’t want them to
burn their one bite at the apple if we can also help.”165 These responses
suggest that how and when a claim arrives in the office might influence a
prosecutor’s response as much as the actual merit of the claim. In the words
of one public defense attorney, “Unless it gets in their little [CIU] they’re still
fighting tooth and nail to save those convictions.”166 Innocence organization
attorneys and others who regularly litigate postconviction claims might
strategize exactly where in the prosecutor’s office they want their case to
land; yet pro se defendants filing behind bars are much less likely to be able
to predict the best course.
Secondly, leadership hierarchies between the CIU and the appeals unit
may undermine the independence of the CIU. According to one innocence
organization respondent, a “structural problem” arises when the CIU chief
reports to the same person who supervises the appeals division. This defense
attorney reported that the chain of command ultimately resulted in appellate
division review of innocence claims, regardless of CIU involvement. As she
described it, “If we just sat down at a table, I’m pretty confident we could do
good work. [The CIU is] part of an institution, and there’s such institutional
resistance.”167 The institutional resistance manifests in the executive
decision about how to staff and supervise the CIU, which, in turn, influences
the decision about the outcome of the claim.
3. Other Approaches
The size of the jurisdiction mattered in the prosecutors’ handling of
innocence claims but did not appear to dictate the approach. Prosecutors
from small jurisdictions (population 500,000 or less), and medium
164

Interview with Prosecutor 26 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
165
Interview with Prosecutor 6 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with author).
166
Interview with Defense Attorney 12 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
167
Interview with Defense Attorney 36 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
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jurisdictions (population between 500,000 and one million) generally lacked
the resources or the caseload to staff a full-time CIU168 or even a separate
appellate division. Instead, these respondents reported that postconviction
innocence claims were either reviewed by the original trial prosecutor
involved in the false conviction, a supervising trial attorney, or the elected
district attorney. In short, a variety of approaches were applied that
demonstrated considerable ingenuity in structuring postconviction innocence
review. Clear guidelines had been established in some of these jurisdictions,
while others’ responses to innocence claims were developed in response to a
specific case and applied episodically. Regardless of the approach, the
office’s handling of innocence claims clearly reflected the decision-making
and management style of the elected prosecutor.
In the two smallest jurisdictions, the elected district attorney chose to
personally review innocence claims. As one of these elected prosecutors, a
former defense attorney, explained, “I’m the one assigning my work, and to
be honest, the cases intrigue me.”169 More commonly, district attorney
respondents reported reviewing innocence claims on an ad hoc basis. For
example, one expressed an open-door policy for defense attorneys on
postconviction claims, saying, “If there is a defense attorney that felt our
appellate team wasn’t giving them the due diligence they should get, they can
always bring it to a supervisor or my attention, too.”170
Similarly, several defense attorneys described taking claims directly to
the elected or to upper management—but only in the most extraordinary
circumstances with the most meritorious cases. For example, one public
defense attorney had a personal connection to the district attorney and was
able to approach him informally. In another such example, the private
defense attorney who submitted the case used to work at the prosecutor’s
office. He explained:
Again, having worked in the district attorney’s office it is based upon almost a military
chain of command. The prosecutors, the trial lawyers are lieutenants. And there are
division chiefs, which are captains. Then there are majors who are over things. Then
the District Attorney is like go and see the general or the president . . . . When you get
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Three of the ten CIU prosecutor respondents worked in medium-sized jurisdictions,
but these units did not handle wrongful conviction claims exclusively with full-time CIU
attorneys.
169
Interview with Prosecutor 20 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
170
Interview with Prosecutor 34 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
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a case like [defendant]’s . . . you want to go to the top and talk with the top people about
it.171

Still, this straight-to-the-top strategy may backfire depending on the
elected prosecutor’s own involvement with the original conviction.
Indeed, two prosecuting attorney respondents reported that, in their
office, innocence claims would be directed to the prosecutor who handled the
underlying conviction. In the face of a lack of data about how postconviction
innocence claims are directed, some scholars have speculated that they might
typically go to the trial attorney involved in the false conviction.172
Therefore, the practice could be more widespread than the two offices in this
sample would suggest. Indeed, five defense attorney respondents related
experiences in which the trial prosecutor had been tasked with responding to
a claim of innocence. A few of the cases resulted in exoneration but only
after being removed from the trial prosecutors’ review. Several additional
defense attorneys encountered the trial prosecutor in other contexts, for
example, at meetings in the district attorney’s office. This public defense
attorney raises one of the challenges of working with the original trial
prosecutor on an innocence claim:
The original trial prosecutor, who didn’t turn over the Brady material, who made
arguments that were not supported by the evidence, was the one who was tasked to
respond. Now that’s number one bad practice . . . . You really should not be having the
trial prosecutor who worked on the case be the one who responds in the collateral
proceeding.173

This respondent highlights the potential conflict of interest inherent to
assigning trial prosecutors to review their own cases. Prosecutorial
misconduct that does not appear on the trial record—such as concealing
exculpatory evidence—is considered new evidence to be submitted during
postconviction.174 One third of the prosecutor and defense attorney

171
Interview with Defense Attorney 28 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
172
E.g., MEDWED, supra note 7, at 128 (writing that many small prosecutors’ offices may
assign postconviction petitions to the lawyer that handled the trial); Green & Yaroshefsky,
supra note 2, at 494 (suggesting that prosecutors’ offices ordinarily refer new evidence of
innocence to the trial prosecutor).
173
Interview with Defense Attorney 25 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
174
See King, supra note 34, at 258 (explaining how direct appeal does not review claims
like ineffective assistance of counsel or the state’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence,
both of which are common contributors of wrongful conviction).
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respondents described handling postconviction innocence claims involving
Brady allegations.175
In one medium-sized jurisdiction, the responsibility for reviewing
innocence claims had recently been reassigned from the original trial
prosecutor to a supervising trial prosecutor. As the supervising trial
prosecutor explained, “If I did something wrong the first time, to ask me to
take a look at it and see if I did anything wrong, I’m probably going to say,
‘Well no.’ Because I’m making the same mistake I made the first time.”176
For this prosecutor, innocence review also functioned as a tool for
evaluating the work product of the line prosecutors under him. His direct
communication with the elected district attorney provided him with decisionmaking autonomy, and his status as the most experienced prosecutor in the
office had prepared him to take on the responsibility. In addition, he handled
all postconviction innocence review claims, including those filed directly by
prisoners as well as those submitted by defense attorneys.
Another supervising trial prosecutor described a similar approach in his
office but stipulated that he only reviewed claims received from innocence
organizations. In this system, the supervising trial prosecutor acts more as
innocence organization liaison than reviewer of innocence claims. Such
processes appeared to be initiated in response to a particular case rather than
guidelines developed as part of a systematic effort to identify false
convictions. In these processes, the supervising trial prosecutor became
involved only after the claim had been vetted by an outside entity.
Similarly, two innocence organization respondents reported that elected
prosecutors had appointed a special prosecutor to handle innocence claims
“with fresh eyes” on a case-by-case basis.177 One of the case reviews was
assigned to a team of two prosecutors, one from the trial division and one
from the appellate division. In the other case, a supervising trial prosecutor
conducted the investigation. Both defense attorneys described appreciating
the refreshing emphasis on factual, rather than procedural, issues:
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A private defense attorney estimated that about 80% of his postconviction case load
included a Brady allegation. He explained the prosecutors’ response: “If a Brady violation
occurred, it has to be dealt with. You can’t just sweep it under the rug. I think it does put
[prosecutors] in an almost immediate defensive mode because they’re sitting there thinking,
okay, a Brady case. We’re going to have to start gathering the troops now.” Interview with
Defense Attorney 2 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with author).
176
Interview with Prosecutor 19 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
177
Interview with Defense Attorney 8 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
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They actually were charged with independently reviewing whether this was a valid
conviction and really focused on the evidence. He wanted to know, do you think that
[the defendant] did it or not?178
Let me say, it’s very similar to what conviction integrity units do, right? Because… the
conviction integrity units, they’re not worried as much about whether there are claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel. They’re saying like, what are our facts? Do the
facts portray a potential mistake here?179

Therefore, even in jurisdictions that lacked the resources (or the
caseload) to devote to a standing CIU, prosecutors were able to achieve
objective postconviction innocence review processes. Nevertheless, such
processes must be distinguished from CIUs by their episodic nature.
Although the actual investigation and case review may resemble the
processes implemented by CIU—and in fact, innocence review
investigations predate the creation of the first CIU180—they may not share
the same systematized approach or public transparency of a good faith CIU.
A district attorney’s decision to initiate such an investigation would still be
highly discretionary.
One district attorney respondent from a medium-sized jurisdiction
described how he had attempted to create postconviction innocence review
practices that would be both systematized and unbiased. His solution
involved soliciting feedback from volunteer, external legal professionals on
all cases under consideration for innocence review by his office. His
comments highlight the obstacles to achieving impartiality in many
jurisdictions. As he explained:
I see some concerns in terms of the bias issue because in my office, there’s [a small
number of] attorneys. Everybody knows each other, respects each other. We function
like a big family here, which is all good. The downside to that is if I’m called upon to
review a case from somebody that I know personally, I’m going into that review biased.
It’s a natural thing. It’s hard to get around that in over probably 90% of prosecutor’s
offices in the country.181
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Id.
Interview with Defense Attorney 1 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
180
See Medwed, supra note 1, at 126 (describing the proactive assistance of the St. Paul,
Minnesota, District Attorney Susan Gaertner in a 2002 DNA exoneration. He writes, “for the
first time, a local district attorney’s office had initiated the process that led to the exoneration
rather than members of the defense team.”); see also Chandler, supra note 91, at 14 (citing an
even earlier effort out of San Diego County when a Deputy District Attorney and DNA expert
there sent letters to “hundreds of convicted persons, offering to test the DNA evidence in their
disposed cases”).
181
Interview with Prosecutor 35 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with the
author).
179
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This respondent was unique for addressing his own potential for bias in
postconviction case review so directly. His previous experience litigating
appeals as a defense attorney may have contributed to this perspective.
In summary, both prosecutors and defense attorney respondents
underscored the salience of the decision about who should conduct
postconviction innocence review.182 The size of the jurisdiction influenced
the options available but did not predict the decision.183 Most prosecutors
from large jurisdictions reported having implemented CIUs or handling
innocence claims through their appellate divisions. Prosecutor respondents
from small and medium-sized jurisdictions described a wider variety of
approaches, though these approaches were more likely developed in response
to a specific innocence claim (or set of claims) rather than established as
protocols to follow as systematically.184 Among the approaches overall,
some acknowledged the potential for bias more than others.185 Prosecutors
in large jurisdictions described the risk for cognitive bias among appellate
prosecutors or an appellate mindset reflective of professional socialization
and the constraints of the postconviction appeals process.186 Reconciling the
relationship between innocence review and the traditional appellate
postconviction process emerged as a primary point of differentiation between
processes.187 Some jurisdictions sought to establish a strict separation
between the two types of review but found the separation difficult to maintain
in practice.188 In small and medium jurisdictions, where small staffs
produced greater familiarity among prosecutors, bias was described more in
terms of a personal conflict of interest.189 At the same time, elected
prosecutors had developed a variety of creative solutions to establish
objective review: appointing special prosecutors to review cases on an ad hoc
basis, tasking supervisory trial prosecutors with innocence review, and
seeking feedback from external reviewers.190
Respondents described how the route chosen for postconviction
innocence claims shaped the handling of the claim—chiefly, CIUs as
compared to appellate divisions, and appellate divisions as compared to
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See supra Section III.A.
See supra Section III.A.3.
See supra Section III.A.3.
See supra Section III.A.
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See supra Section III.A.2.
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See supra Section III.A.3.
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district attorney or supervising trial attorney review.191 Therefore, before a
claim even arrives in the office, important decisions influencing its success
or failure have already been made by the elected prosecutor and the executive
team.192 Once processes have been established, individual prosecutors then
decide whether or not to pursue any given claim.193
B. SCREENING DECISIONS

While executive decisions clearly determined which prosecutor would
be tasked with reviewing innocence claims, individual “worker” prosecutors
had more discretionary power to determine screening decisions, such as
whether an innocence claim would be pursued for investigation and review.
Still, even these individual decisions were shaped by the expectations of the
executive team and the constraints imposed by the postconviction appeals
system. The estimated number of postconviction innocence claims that
prosecutors received varied from one office to the next and, indeed, was
seldom tracked. The difficulty in keeping track—particularly for those
offices lacking a CIU—arose partially from the ambiguity about what was
meant by “post-conviction innocence claim.” Prosecutors’ in these offices
often defined an innocence claim as one that had transcended the
postconviction haystack—having been received by an innocence
organization, for example. Therefore, a pro se, postconviction motion
claiming innocence would not uniformly be considered an innocence claim.
Prosecutors reported innocence claims as deriving from a wide variety
of sources: prisoners and parolees, family members and other advocates,
defense attorneys, judges, other prosecutors, and reporters. Four of the
prosecutor respondents also described reviewing cases for forensic error or
police misconduct in the wake of some discovery of wrongdoing. According
to prosecutor respondents, however, the majority of innocence claims took
the form of pro se appeals or a letter sent directly from a prisoner or prisoner’s
family member. The shorthand for this type of intake, “jail mail,”194 reveals
the potential stigma attributed to the return address. Since defendants in the
postconviction stages are not entitled to defense counsel in most states,195 a
large volume of pro se claims is inevitable. Moreover, it stands to reason that
such claims will have increased along with the increasing length of custodial
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See supra Section III.A.
See supra Section III.A.
See infra Section III.B.
Interview with Prosecutor 6 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with author).
See Findley, supra note 40, at 605.

288

WEBSTER

[Vol. 110

sentences; prisoners may now be more likely to reach the postconviction
stage while still behind bars.196
Only the CIU prosecutors described the processes involved in actually
responding to every claim. They provided examples of the types of claims
that could be quickly screened out, such as requests for assistance with a
conviction outside the jurisdiction and requests for a sentence reduction
rather than an innocence investigation. All CIU prosecutors received
requests like these that fell outside the purview of the unit. Some CIU
prosecutors also described limiting case selection in various ways, such as by
imposing the following requirements: that cases must have gone to trial; that
cases must involve serious, violent felonies; that defendants must still be in
custody; that defendants must have defense counsel; and that cases must have
a forensic hook. Claims not meeting these eligibility criteria could be
screened out. All other requests for assistance, “jail mail” or otherwise,
would receive some type of response, usually a request for more information
or a recommendation that the defendant secure counsel. Rather than provide
estimates of the total number of postconviction innocence claims received,
CIU prosecutors in smaller jurisdictions offered the total number of cases
that had been reviewed since the CIU’s implementation (these ranged from
four197 to “less than 30 or 40”198). CIU prosecutors in larger jurisdictions
offered the number currently being reviewed (these ranged from forty-four199
to 200200). However, not all prosecutors were able to provide these numbers.
CIU attorneys’ descriptions of intake processes in large jurisdictions
revealed the logistical challenges of pursuing pro se claims. Despite the large
number of requests from prisoners claiming innocence, respondents reported
that few followed up after their initial inquiry. When pro se claimants did
respond, the process was still inevitably delayed due to the lagged
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As one public defense attorney explained: “With the stiffening of the sentences both
at the federal levels and the 1986 sentencing commission and the big uptick in the federal
sentences and similarly in the states. Now the sentences were getting much longer all the way
across the board. So the number of cases went way up . . . So everybody was really scrambling
just to keep up with those two surges[.]” Interview with Defense Attorney 30 (confidential
unpublished interview) (on file with author).
197
Interview with Prosecutor 29 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
198
Interview with Prosecutor 35 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
199
Interview with Prosecutor 24 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
200
Interview with Prosecutor 27 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
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communication. In theory, all claims were treated fairly; in practice, some
claims could be handled more readily than others.
Several CIU prosecutors in large jurisdictions receiving a high volume
of postconviction innocence claims spoke of a triage system201 in which
defense attorney claims took priority: “Part of me when I first started is like,
‘I’m going to look at every single case and I’m going to give everyone the
same kind of consideration.’ You really can’t do that just because the
resources aren’t available, and you have to learn how to triage the cases.”
She added:
I still think it’s kind of unfair that just because someone has an attorney that maybe
their cases jump to the front of the line. We used to do things as they came in, but then
we had to triage things more because we had so much coming in, we have to look at
the ones . . . where we might be doing something on the case, giving relief.202

As this CIU prosecutor explained, time spent on meritless claims came
at the cost of delaying review for those actually innocent people waiting to
have their claims considered. Put simply, “if you get too bogged down in
every case, you’re never going to find the ones that matter.”203 Such
statements suggest the CIU prosecutors’ willingness to identify false
convictions, even if they are not able to provide the same level of review to
every claim.
In contrast, some non-CIU prosecutors openly expressed skepticism
about pro se innocence claims: “Unfortunately, everyone claims they didn’t
do it;”204 “The vast majority of these claims are filed pro se by defendants,
and they have absolutely no merit to them, and you can tell that they’ve
traded some cigarettes to somebody for a form that they’ve filled in the
blanks on;”205 “When I say merit, I mean it’s not a laughably ridiculous
position.”206
201
The practice of prioritizing certain cases over others, or triaging, has been a subject of
legal research on public defenders in earlier stages of criminal justice system processing. See
generally L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender
Triage, 122 YALE L.J. 2626 (2013) (presenting a framework for public defender triage that
seeks to minimize implicit bias).
202
Interview with Prosecutor 27 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
203
Interview with Prosecutor 37 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
204
Interview with Prosecutor 21 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
205
Interview with Prosecutor 19 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
206
Interview with Prosecutor 32 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
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Compare the challenges and frustrations that prosecutors described with
pro se claims to the relative ease they experienced when receiving cases from
trusted defense attorneys. These defense attorneys had already vetted the
case, they could anticipate questions and challenges, and they could present
the legal arguments in a cogent, skilled manner. Prosecutors could readily
meet with defense attorneys, share information, and learn about the status of
the case through qualified counsel proficient in legal negotiations. Eleven
respondents (both defense attorneys and prosecutors) said that the defense
had presented their cases to prosecutors in person. Most often, the defense
team came to the prosecutors’ offices to pitch the cases rather than hosting
the prosecutors. At this pitch meeting, defense could identify credible
potential errors in the conviction; they could share results of their initial
reinvestigation; and they could answer prosecutors’ questions on the spot.
Such opportunities are simply not available to defendants and their family
members. The distinction is made clear in this private defense attorney’s
description of his presentation to prosecutors:
Prosecutors are going to think that every defendant is going to profess and claim his
innocence over and over again. If it were just based upon [the defendant] coming back
and saying, “yeah, I didn’t do this and somebody else did it.” But again, this was a lot
of detective work. When you lay all this out to them, showed them the pictures . . . . and
laid this out in a cognitive, organized, objective analysis, they came pretty quickly to
the conclusion that this needed to be undone.207

The private defense attorney in this case was well known to the
prosecution through his previous professional experience as a prosecutor. In
fact, the defendant had previously filed a pro se postconviction motion, but
these appeals had failed. Without the means to afford a private defense
attorney, the defendant likely would not have prevailed, and the error would
have never been discovered.
The limitations of postconviction processes for actually innocent
defendants led one CIU prosecutor to describe the work of CIUs as a “last
resort.”208 She explained:
If all else fails, you’ve got the [CIU]. That’s really where I see us going at this point is
that we are really a last resort option. Because if you think about it, if you follow a
postconviction, that’s adversarial. We’re there to defend our conviction. It’s adversarial
by nature. Not everything can be resolved outside of the courtroom. However, let’s say
that the information or the evidence that you have doesn’t fit squarely in that
postconviction arena, as in maybe you’ve already had your postconviction. Maybe your

207

Interview with Defense Attorney 28 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
208
Interview with Prosecutor 33 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
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attorney, while their performance wasn’t something that was super star worthy, you’re
not entitled to the best defense possible.209

By the time this CIU learned about the case through innocence
organization attorneys, the defendant had exhausted his appeals. His
postconviction petition had been denied. To its credit, the CIU devoted an
extraordinary amount of attention to this case. However, by then, many years
had passed since the defendant’s false conviction and failed appeals. If
innocence claims are those that do not “fit squarely in that postconviction
arena,”210 then every stage prior to innocence review will initiate an
adversarial response. Thus, CIU review is established in opposition to
traditional postconviction review. The danger here is that prosecutors
engaged in CIU review may reflexively perceive procedural claims—such as
ineffective
assistance
of
counsel—as
falling
into
the
appellate/postconviction/habeas pool rather than the actual innocence pool.
Defendants can, of course, be factually innocent and also have suffered from
procedural flaws at trial.
Prosecutor respondents rarely mentioned the time or procedural hassles
involved for defendants. However, two non-CIU veteran prosecutors
acknowledged that defendants they helped exonerate had been writing to
their office for years prior to any substantial consideration. One said, “[he]
had been writing to me for, oh my god, 20 years. ‘I’m innocent. I’m
innocent,’ all this stuff . . . . anyway, I took the case.”211 Another described
the defendant as “a fairly active pro se litigant . . . I actually recognized his
name just because he filed lots of papers.”212 In both instances, falsely
convicted defendants spent years trying to prevail upon the prosecutors’
office before their claim was reviewed. A less persistent defendant,
especially one who had been released in the intervening years, might have
been overlooked entirely. These three prosecutor respondents suggest that
the persistence of the defendant, as demonstrated through his failure to
receive consideration on appeal, had become a de facto requirement for
review.
Still, a few prosecutors, both CIU and non-CIU, related efforts that they
had taken on behalf of pro se claimants that had fizzled out.213 A few others
209

Interview with Prosecutor 33 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
210
See supra note 173.
211
Interview with Prosecutor 17 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
212
Interview with Prosecutor 9 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with author).
213
For example, a prisoner asked CIU Prosecutor 29 to interview a witness that he claimed
would substantiate his claim of innocence. Instead, the witness admitted that the prisoner had
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independently helped exonerate pro se defendants. A closer look at these
three exoneration cases, however, reveals that each provided an external
incentive to assist, which may have allowed the claim to supersede the usual
reluctance to engage pro se claimants. For example, in one of the cases, the
district attorney happened to be engaged in the prosecution of the actual
perpetrator of the crime when he received the innocent prisoner’s letter. The
claimant’s description of the evidence led him to realize that the case may
have been connected to the one that he was currently prosecuting. In another
case, the defendant’s innocence claims had already been reported in the
media, generating popular support for the defendant. In the third case, a
credible victim—who had no previous relationship to the defendant—
regretted her testimony and recanted her statements.
In summary, the context of the appellate structure, specifically, the lack
of representation for postconviction claimants leading to a profusion of pro
se claims, appeared to shape prosecutors’ case selection decisions.214
Further, prosecutors tended to direct their role obligation towards those
claimants who had already exhausted alternative options.215 Although CIU
prosecutors demonstrated a greater sense of responsibility in responding to
requests, all prosecutor respondents expressed the strong preference to work
with trusted defense attorneys or innocence organization attorneys and
described the challenges of working with pro se claimants as nearly
insurmountable.216
C. DETERMINING THE OUTCOME

In contrast to the rapid decision-making of earlier stages—for example,
charging and plea bargaining—individual “worker” prosecutors are not
empowered to determine the outcome of an innocence review or innocence
investigation. As one appellate prosecutor respondent explained, “Letting
somebody out of prison is not something a line prosecutor has the power to
do.”217
An innocence organization respondent described the “line
prosecutor” position:
Not a supervisor, not the elected person, but someone who’s on the front lines doing
the cases. When you look at a legal brief, usually if you see a bunch of names on it,

asked him to fabricate the story to get his mother off his back. Interview with Prosecutor 29
(confidential unpublished interview) (on file with author).
214
See supra Section III.B.
215
See supra Section III.B.
216
See supra Section III.B.
217
Interview with Prosecutor 32 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
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the top person is the highest in the office hierarchy, the bottom person is the one who
actually did the work, that’s usually the line attorney.218

In the context of the postconviction arena, even a CIU chief may lack
discretion.
Defense attorney respondents often characterized the limited discretion
as a hindrance that caused delays in case resolution and complicated
communication with the district attorneys’ office. As the following quotes
demonstrate, some defense attorneys regretted having to gain the approval of
upper management whom they believed to be less likely to agree to relief:
Line prosecutors . . . they don’t get to make decisions. They’re down here, and
someone above them has to approve it, so they may want to do the right thing. They
just don’t have the authority to do it . . . . They’re not going to tank the prosecution
because then they’ll get fired.219
He may actually see the merits in the cases, but he’s constantly trying to figure out how
he’s going to defend his action of “letting somebody go”—is the way they see it—to
his higher ups.220
The associate DAs that you’re going to deal with are very fearful of the elected DA and
they don’t want to cross them . . . . Their job is at the whim of the elected DA whether
they’re going to keep their job or not.221

To summarize the three, line prosecutors may want to “do the right
thing” by “letting somebody go” but their job security depends on the elected
DA’s “whims.” These defense attorneys believed that job insecurity and a
desire to satisfy the boss drove the prosecutors’ responses rather than their
genuine impressions about the merits of the innocence claim.
A public defense attorney conveyed similar sentiments. In this case, he
suspected that the challenges he experienced communicating with the CIU
prosecutor may have been a reflection of the inconsistent messages she
received from higher ups:
She’s like, ‘I still got to talk to my supervisors, but I don’t think anything is gonna
happen.’ I’m like, ‘okay fine.’ So, then the next call I get from her is much more
positive . . . . It was basically like which higher up she spoke to that day. You know,

218

Interview with Defense Attorney 4 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
219
Interview with Defense Attorney 12 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
220
Interview with Defense Attorney 36 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
221
Interview with Defense Attorney 2 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
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maybe one higher up was in favor of [reinvestigating the case] and one higher up
wasn’t. I don’t know, but she went back and forth. It was really crazy.222

Defense attorneys often expressed frustration with the need to relay
communication through the line prosecutor, and the delays that this caused
in resolving the case. Some wished that they could go above the line
prosecutors and communicate directly with the executive team. For example,
one private defense attorney explained, “In this business, you just have to
recognize that you’re dealing with a person who has no authority to make a
decision, and there’s nothing to be gained by trying to get mad at them or put
them in a spot.”223
While this attorney suggests the need for collegiality when dealing with
line prosecutors, he also acknowledges the tendency to “get mad” when
“dealing with a person who has no authority to make a decision.”224
Prosecutor respondents accepted that the final decision would be left to
the district attorney. Supervising, senior trial prosecutors tasked with
innocence review voiced a greater sense of vertical autonomy than did CIU
prosecutors or appellate prosecutors. As one stated, “I acknowledge that I
work for someone else, but he gives me an awful lot of authority and
discretion.”225 CIU prosecutor respondents explained that after leading the
reinvestigation or case review, they would make a recommendation about the
best course of action.226 According to this CIU attorney, “These decisions
concerning exoneration are always a big deal. And they usually are going to
involve multiple points of view. We’ve had internal disagreements in
cases . . . and ultimately the DA will then make the decision of what he or
she wants to do.”227
CIU prosecutors, like this one, reported making outcome decisions with
a team of attorneys. Typically, this took the form of an extended meeting (or
even series of meetings) involving a group of attorneys selected and
222

Interview with Defense Attorney 25 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
223
Interview with Defense Attorney 31 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
224
Interview with Defense Attorney 31 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
225
Interview with Prosecutor 19 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
226
Hollway, supra note 95, at 24 (Each of the nineteen offices in this study of CIUs
reported that their elected district attorney made the final decision in felony cases. “[A]ll
agreed that the role of the CRU is to advise the DA on how to answer this important question,
and not to actually answer the question itself.”) (emphasis added).
227
Interview with Prosecutor 16 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
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assembled by the district attorney. Respondents described meetings
involving the CIU attorney, deputy attorneys, appellate attorneys, the trial
prosecutor, and even the defense attorney.228 This meeting, termed
“DEFCON 5”229 by one CIU attorney,230 culminated in a decision about
whether or not the prosecution would agree to dismiss the defendant’s
conviction or grant some other form of relief. “Internal disagreements” can
be explored through DEFCON 5. In the following description of the process,
the CIU prosecutor reported that the district attorney had assembled the entire
CIU, the executive staff, a team member specializing in policy, and a team
member specializing in ethics:
The district attorney is going to want all the facts. She’s going to have questions. Let’s
say it’s an investigation I ran. I’ll be sitting there just answering questions, giving my
opinion and obviously my recommendation. We don’t always agree . . . . These
discussions are very beneficial . . . . It’s a lot of thinking. It’s a lot of caring. I don’t
think anyone realizes how much of that is done.231

For this CIU prosecutor, the critical analysis of the evidence and the
recommendation—under the strong leadership of the district attorney—
helped ensure full deliberation in the final decision.
However, other CIU prosecutors and defense attorney respondents
described how disagreements over cases could lead to office discord. These
prosecutors feared that their recommendations for relief would not survive
the dissent within the ranks. One innocence organization attorney who had
attended a DEFCON 5 meeting described how the decision was resolved in
spite of the trial prosecutor’s objection. The prosecutor who had originally
tried the case “was very adamant that she had not gotten the wrong guy.”232
Likewise, two CIU prosecutors reported that the trial prosecutor was always
invited to weigh in at the final decision meeting. Others reported that
attorneys from the appellate division would be invited to attend. Therefore,
team meetings may put the CIU attorney in the position of justifying her
recommendation to dismiss the conviction to colleagues who have a stake in
upholding the conviction. For example, one CIU prosecutor spent months
228

Two defense attorney respondents described attending a meeting at which an outcome
decision was expected to be made. Interviews with Defense Attorney 3, 25 (confidential
unpublished interviews) (on file with author).
229
DEFCON 5 refers to “DEFense readiness CONdition,” a system employed in the
military to determine levels of alertness.
230
Interview with Prosecutor 27 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
231
Interview with Prosecutor 27 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
232
Interview with Defense Attorney 3 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with
author).
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investigating an innocence claim (for which her office invested considerable
resources) only to have the appellate division attorneys nearly succeed in
undermining her recommendation that the defendant be exonerated.233
In all but four of the jurisdictions,234 the prosecutor and members of the
executive team made the final decision about the outcome of a postconviction
innocence claim, while line prosecutors conducted the case review and the
reinvestigation. In every CIU case decision described here, multiple
attorneys—some with countervailing interests—were consulted in the final
decision. Therefore, these prosecutors who were consulted for the final
review also had the potential to influence the final outcome. Relatedly, the
limited decision-making power among line prosecutors—including CIU
attorneys—frustrated some defense attorneys who communicated mainly
with these line prosecutors, and not with the final decision-makers. Some
defense attorneys attributed the opacity of prosecutors’ decision-making
processes to these hierarchical dynamics.
IV. DISCUSSION
This study examines postconviction innocence review practices among
a sample of prosecutors’ offices where false convictions have been
successfully identified and remedied. It has explored how multiple levels of
decision-making—from the courts and lawmakers, to district attorneys and
their executive teams, to individual line prosecutors—guide salient decisions
such as who will be tasked with innocence review,235 how cases will be
screened,236 and how outcomes will be determined.237 In light of the
difficulty discovering criminal justice system accidents as compared to other
high-risk fields,238 and compounded by the failings of judicial review for
factually innocent defendants,239 prosecutorial ability to identify error takes
on special significance. The ability of the individual prosecutor—the
worker—to identify such errors can best be understood within the context of
workplace practices and organizational principles.240
The study draws from a sample of both CIU and non-CIU attorneys,
therefore enabling comparisons between CIU processes and non-CIU
233

Interview with Prosecutor 5 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with author).
Exceptions lie in the two jurisdictions where district attorneys conducted their own
reinvestigations and the two jurisdictions where supervising trial prosecutors did so.
235
See supra Section III.A.
236
See supra Section III.B.
237
See supra Section III.C.
238
See supra Section I.
239
See supra Section I.A.
240
See supra Section I.
234
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processes. While CIU offers a more systematized approach through case
screening and the ability to handle large-scale case reviews, small and
medium-sized jurisdictions accomplished objective innocence review on a
case-by-case basis.241 Both CIU and non-CIU processes reflected the
influence of the appellate process as manifested in the challenges of
separation between innocence review and appellate review,242 the risk of
appellate attorney bias,243 and the disadvantage to pro se defendants.244 The
appellate structure influenced how prosecutors perceived their role
obligations towards postconviction innocence claims.245 The profusion of
pro se claims and the belated consideration of new evidence shaped a
preference for cases handled by innocence organizations and other trusted
defense attorneys in both types of offices.
In sum, prosecutors’
postconviction efforts overall did not appear likely to benefit pro se
defendants or to identify false convictions that had not already been identified
by capable defense and/or adopted by journalists.246 Prosecutors conducting
innocence claim reviews, or establishing structures for others to conduct such
reviews, do so in the context of a system that emphasizes procedural errors
over factual ones and that allows for a narrow and belated discovery of false
convictions.247 Although every one of the prosecutors’ offices described here
contributed to an exoneration, some workplace organizational structures
seemed to enable more sustainable and unbiased innocence review than
others.248
Some offices appeared to rely upon the postconviction model, even
when conducting innocence review.249 Selecting the original trial prosecutor
to review her own case mirrors the process for judicial review.250 Despite the
potential for bias, appellate practice has normalized this course by directing
postconviction claims to the trial judge.251 Such actors may be subject to
cognitive bias such as hindsight and outcome bias252—having believed in the
defendant’s guilt once, they are more likely to view the outcome of his
241

See supra Section III.A–III.B.
See supra Section III.A–III.B.
243
See supra Section III.A–III.B.
244
See supra Section III.B.
245
See supra Section III.
246
See supra Section III. Or, less often, through other advocates of the defendant such as
prosecutors, judges, or reporters.
247
See supra Section I.A–I.B
248
See supra Section III.
249
See supra Section III.A.3.
250
See supra Section III.A.
251
See supra note 45 and accompanying discussion.
252
See Findley & Scott, supra note 22, at 319–20.
242
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conviction as correct.253 They may also be presented with conflicts of interest
in the form of Brady allegations or other types of prosecutorial misconduct
in which the trial prosecutor reviewing the claim would have a vested interest
in denying the allegation and upholding the conviction.254 When trial
prosecutors do not conduct the case review, but are nonetheless consulted
about a potential false conviction case,255 these same conflicts may also arise.
CIU prosecutors and defense attorney respondents also suggested that
the appellate prosecutor can be limited in their outlook through their
professional focus on procedural errors and biased through their personal
familiarity with individual appellants.256 Rather than being empowered with
a sense of their role obligation as a safeguard against false convictions, a
righter-of-wrongs, or a “minister of justice,”257 appellate prosecutors are
assumed to adopt an adversarial posture.258 Respondents’ statements suggest
that appellate prosecutors fail to identify factual errors because their
professional socialization discourages objective case review.259
For their part, CIU attorneys argue that they serve a distinct function
that is not met through traditional postconviction review.260 Indeed,
recommendations for CIU best practices suggests maintaining separation
from the appeals division.261 However, the challenges of implementing this
separation in practice became apparent through respondents’ remarks.262
Office structure and hierarchy, supervision of the CIU, and interoffice case
flow each served to threaten the independence and efficacy of the CIU.263
Therefore, despite respondents’ misgivings, it may be worthwhile to
consider the possible benefits of involving appellate attorneys in
253

See supra Section I.C.
See Swisher, supra note 1, at 188 (“The serious conflict is between justice and the
prosecutor’s personal interest. The prosecutor has an interest, however subconscious or
shortsighted, in not attacking her previous work product.”); INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note
100 (recommending that cases involving prosecutorial misconduct be redirected to an
independent agency for review. “Cases involving substantial, non‐conclusory allegations of
prosecutorial misconduct involving prior or former members of the office should be referred
to an independent authority for investigation and review. This referral should include both the
allegations of misconduct as well as the claims of innocence and constitutional violations.”).
255
See supra Section III.A.
256
See supra Section III.A.
257
See MODEL RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT, supra note 3 (“A prosecutor has the
responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.”)
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See supra Section III.A.
259
See supra Section III.A.
260
See supra Section III.A.
261
See Hollway, supra note 95, at 23–24.
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See supra Section III.A.
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See supra Section III.A.
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postconviction innocence review. Could improved communication between
postconviction units and CIUs facilitate discovery of potential false
convictions under the right circumstances? Appellate prosecutors might
have an advantage through their knowledge of the relevant case law and their
experience with the judicial review process. They may more readily identify
common, underlying problems across petitions, including bad actors or bad
procedures. They may recognize persistent defendants who steadfastly
maintain innocence. They may signal problem cases sooner, under direct
appeal, reducing the delay between false conviction and exoneration.
For inexperienced prosecutors, appeals could provide an opportunity to
learn about courtroom dynamics before arguing cases in court.264 If such
prosecutors are rewarded for objectively considering the merits of
postconviction claims, rather than encouraged to consistently assume an
adversarial response, they may serve the important function of flagging cases
for innocence review.265 A rigidly hierarchical structure may, in fact, stifle
the discovery of errors if subordinates are afraid to come forward.266 In small
jurisdictions lacking an appellate division, line prosecutors could be
encouraged to bring false conviction claims to the attention of their superiors,
whether these were received through “jail mail” or originated from innocence
organizations.
A. REFORMS FOR PROSECUTORS’ OFFICES

Chief prosecutors bear the responsibility for the final outcome decision
in a postconviction innocence reinvestigation. Since few chief prosecutors
are able to spearhead reinvestigations personally, they must delegate
responsibility to staff attorneys who have no stake in the final outcome and,
ideally, no prior experience with the claims either in the appellate or trial
context. In CIU offices, appellate prosecutors could help identify potential
false convictions and file for extension if more time is needed to pursue the
264
The career path of respondent prosecutors varied considerably, however, three of them
reported that their initial placement in the district attorney’s office had been in an appellate
division.
265
See Levenson, supra note 52, at 550 (“[I]t is important to examine what we are trying
to accomplish by postconviction review. If it is just a continuation of the adversarial process
of trial, it may be less likely to uncover mistakes that tainted the original proceedings.
However, if it is a collaborative effort between defense lawyers and prosecutors, it has the
potential to expose failures in the criminal justice system.”).
266
For example, aviation industry practices of “crew resource management” empowers
subordinates to bring issues to their supervisor when they discover something amiss. See Bob
Barrett, #1354: “The Aviation-Medicine Connection”, THE BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE (Sept.
1, 2016), http://wamc.org/post/1354-aviation-medicine-connection [https://perma.cc/9Q2FKUHM].
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claim out of court. This arrangement need not require appellate prosecutors
to be further involved in the case review. In non-CIU offices, postconviction
innocence review could be assigned to a supervising trial prosecutor—
provided that she did not secure the original conviction and so long as she
did not default to reviewing only those claims pre-vetted by innocence
organizations.267
Therefore, in both CIU and non-CIU offices, appellate and other line
prosecutors reviewing postconviction claims could be trained to recognize
correlates of false conviction. These correlates may vary by jurisdiction and
need not be limited to the canonical list offered by innocence organizations
(eyewitness misidentification, false confessions, forensic error, etc.).268
Rather, jurisdictional variation may produce patterns such as misuse of
specific informants, reliance on outdated forensic disciplines, testimony of
discredited police officers, and more.269 Prosecutor-initiated internal case
audits have exonerated dozens of wrongfully convicted men and women
following exposure of police misconduct.270 Local prosecutors’ offices are
well positioned to identify problematic actors, conduct internal reviews, and
create “no call” lists so that discredited officers and analysts will not be asked
to testify.271 Prosecutors’ heightened attention to these potential errors on a
systematic, ongoing basis makes excellent use of the prosecutorial function
as a safeguard.
First, prosecutors should recognize the possibility of a meritorious pro
se claim, not just those claims receiving the extraordinary advocacy of

267
See Webster, supra note 69, at 340 (finding a positive correlation between innocence
organization involvement and prosecutor’s assistance in exoneration).
268
See Samuel Gross, Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANN. REV. L. & L. & SOC. SCI. 173, 186–
87 (2008) (referring to the “canonical list of factors that lead to false convictions” and adding
“they are not factors that we can use to identify, or predict, or prevent false convictions, and
it’s not clear how much they contribute to the processes that produce these miscarriages of
justice.”).
269
See Scheck, Conviction Integrity Units Revisited, supra note 92, 721–26 (discussing
how prosecutors have conducted internal reviews, e.g. the Brooklyn conviction review unit’s
review of police misconduct and the Houston conviction review unit review of backlogged
cases from the forensic drug lab).
270
See for example Cook County, Chicago, where the Foxx administration has overturned
sixty-three convictions to date related to the misconduct of a corrupt officer. See Christine
Hauser, ‘A Stain on the City’: 63 People’s Convictions Tossed in Chicago Police Scandal,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/13/us/chicago-exonerationsdrug-sentences.html [https://perma.cc/5Y9D-8BH6].
271
See generally Rachel Lippmann, Gardner Blocks 28 St. Louis Police Officers from
Bringing Cases to Court, ST. LOUIS PUBLIC RADIO (Aug. 30, 2018), https://news.stlpublicradi
o.org/post/gardner-blocks-28-st-louis-police-officers-bringing-cases-court#stream/0
[https://perma.cc/WJ4U-6RW5].
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innocence organizations and other specialized postconviction attorneys.
While it may be true that most postconviction pro se claims will lack merit,
it is also true that many exonerated defendants have filed such claims and
failed, in spite of their innocence.272 Prosecutors screening postconviction
claims might be trained in the objective triage practices recommended for
public defenders by Richardson and Goff.273 These practices include
avoiding preconceptions about the possibility of factual innocence, creating
checklists to use when evaluating cases, and collecting data about their own
decision-making.274 Given the heavy volume of cases that each attorney
receives, written guidelines about how to screen and how to track decisions
may help prevent bias and promote more purposeful, consistent decisionmaking.275
Boehm suggests that prosecutors take up the triage approach by
handling claims from those with the most serious offenses or the longest
sentences first.276 By prioritizing claims from innocence organizations and
postconviction defense attorneys, however, this is not quite what prosecutors
are doing. Although innocence organizations themselves tend to prioritize
serious convictions with lengthy sentences, not every case with this urgent
level of need will be accepted by the innocence organization. Some states do
not have a resident innocence organization,277 and the one that they do have
may barely be able to keep up with the demand. Some innocence
organizations only accept certain types of cases, for example, those with the
possibility of exculpatory postconviction DNA testing.278 Although some

272

See GARRETT, supra note 41, at 196 (studying the subset of the first 250 DNA
exonerations in which written judicial opinions could be located—165 cases. Of these 165
cases, 43% of defendants filed postconviction petitions and 21% filed federal habeas
petitions).
273
Richardson & Goff, supra note 201, at 2644–45 (recommending establishing objective
triage standards and maintaining accountability by tracking data about cases).
274
See id. at 2641–48.
275
See id.
276
Boehm, supra note 80, at 663.
277
See MAP OF INNOCENCE NETWORK MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS, https://innocencenet
work.org/members/#map [https://perma.cc/FDR5-Z4EU] (showing Innocence Network
member directory map for states with an Innocence Network member organization). The
Innocence Network is an international affiliation of innocence organizations. As of this
writing, states without members appear to include North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa,
Nebraska, Kansas, Nevada, South Carolina, Tennessee, Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware,
Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island.
278
See, e.g., INNOCENCE PROJECT, SUBMIT A CASE, https://www.innocenceproject.org/
submit-case/ [https://perma.cc/M77B-YLYY] (providing a list of restrictions on case
acceptance, including: “The Innocence Project does NOT review claims where DNA testing
cannot prove innocence.”).
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prosecutor respondents asserted that their state innocence organizations
could be relied upon exclusively, such conditions are sure to be regional and
conditional upon funding. Some innocence organizations struggle to make
ends meet through grants and private donations.279 Innocence organizations
cannot always be depended upon as a fail-safe for innocent defendants in
most states,280 and private attorney fees are out of reach for most
defendants.281
Whatever practices prosecutors’ offices employ, internal and external
transparency is critical. A wide range of variables such as jurisdiction size,282
existing state remedies for postconviction innocence review,283 role of the
Attorney General,284 budgetary constraints,285 presence of local innocence
organization(s),286 and more, will necessarily produce a heterogeneity of
279

See MEDWED, supra note 7, at 136 (“The very survival of an innocence project may
depend on luck, on the goodwill of a smattering of donors and law school deans.”).
280
See supra notes 277, 279.
281
One of the five private defense attorneys interviewed approached the topic of private
attorney fees for postconviction clients, saying, “One thing I found out from wading into this
[postconviction] work is that it’s extremely time consuming if you’re trying to do it as a solo
practitioner. When I first got into this, the minimum fee I kept getting quoted is $25,000. I
thought, I can do it for less than that but really, that would be foolhardy. Of course, most
people in these situations don’t have $25,000. I told a lot of people to call the [LOCAL
INNOCENCE ORGANIZATION] or here and there. They get full up, you know, they can’t
take anymore.” Interview with Defense Attorney 2 (confidential unpublished interview) (on
file with author).
282
For example, smaller jurisdictions may not have the resources or the caseload to justify
creating a CIU. Hollway, supra note 95, at 21 (“It should be noted, though, that many smaller
state or local prosecutors’ offices may lack the resources to separately staff a CRU.”).
283
For an overview of the variation in state remedies, see Brooks et al., supra note 31, at
1078 (recognizing states such as California, Connecticut, Illinois, New Mexico and New York
which “have explicitly recognized the right to a freestanding claim of actual innocence” and
noting that still other states treat postconviction newly discovered evidence claims as
synonymous to actual innocence claims); Leventhal, supra note 31, at 1477 (discussing the
states that recognize “freestanding claims of actual innocence,” and the limitations of these
measures, including Illinois, New Mexico, and Maryland).
284
In some states the Attorney General’s office may conduct most postconviction review
or initiate wrongful conviction case review processes. See COLO. DEP’T OF LAW, ATTORNEY
GENERAL ANNOUNCES COLORADO’S RECEIPT OF $1.2 MILLION IN FEDERAL FUNDS TO START A
DNA-BASED EXONERATION PROGRAM, https://www.denverda.org/wp-content/uploads/newsrelease/2009/Justice-Review-Project.pdf [https://perma.cc/U7UU-3PAV].
285
In response to budgetary constraints, some jurisdictions may apply for federal grant
funds to support a CIU. See BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, UPHOLDING THE RULE OF LAW AND
PREVENTING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS PROGRAM FY 2019 COMPETITIVE GRANT
ANNOUNCEMENT, https://www.bja.gov/funding/URLPWC19.pdf [https://perma.cc/XNX7FCML].
286
See generally MAP OF INNOCENCE NETWORK MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 277
and accompanying text.
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approaches. Therefore, it is to be expected that postconviction innocence
review practices will vary across states and even within states. When chief
prosecutors clearly communicate these practices internally, they can provide
line prosecutors conducting postconviction case review with a greater sense
of discretion and facilitate collaboration with defense attorneys. By clearly
communicating policies externally, they assist defense attorneys and pro se
defendants in strategizing about how to proceed with their claims. This will
conserve prosecutors’ resources and assist state lawmakers in identifying
potential gaps in postconviction innocence review that could be filled
through a state innocence commission, statewide appellate office, or other
mechanism. CIUs will experience growing pains through trial and error as
they implement systematic innocence review practices.287 Transparency,
even throughout these periods of trial and error, may ultimately result in more
sustainable solutions.
B. REFORMS FOR THE POSTCONVICTION APPEALS PROCESS

Without commensurate reforms to the postconviction appeals process,
the individual efforts of prosecutors to correct false convictions are unlikely
to improve outcomes for postconviction claimants who cannot find
representation among innocence organizations or afford private counsel, and
they will almost certainly fail to shorten time to exoneration. In some states,
structural reforms to the appellate process are long overdue.288 The findings
reported here suggest that prosecutors rarely review innocence claims until
the defendant has already exhausted every other option.289 This inefficiency
taxes the appellate system as much as it harms the falsely convicted. In order
to “narrow the error correction gap,” Nancy King recommends allowing
defendants to file a postconviction motion before completing the direct
appeal.290 Some states already do this;291 others have created a loophole for
287

See supra Section III.A.
See generally Findley, supra note 40, at 592 (exploring reforms to the appellate process
that will address failings “to protect against wrongful convictions”); Hartung, supra note 57,
at 252 (arguing for the need for retrospective policy change directed towards postconviction
procedure); Leventhal, supra note 31, at 1486 (arguing that “a freestanding claim of actual
innocence on constitutional grounds would overcome the procedural hurdles to postconviction
relief”); Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679 (2007) (proposing that appellate
attorneys be able to file claims of ineffectiveness on direct appeal in certain circumstances).
289
See supra Section III.B.
290
King, supra note 34, at 267 (suggesting “steps to narrow the error correction gap”).
291
See Findley, supra note 40, at 611 (comparing Wisconsin’s postconviction system with
those in other states. Petitioners often tried to raise postconviction issues on direct appeal,
taxing the system. “The advantage of Wisconsin’s process from an innocence protection
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defendants to file ineffective assistance of counsel claims sooner.292 Such
remedies are necessary to ensure that defendants can raise postconviction
innocence claims in a timely manner and before they are deprived of the
assistance of defense counsel.
State legislatures may also establish or strengthen new evidence statutes
for defendants to file “freestanding” actual innocence claims based on new
evidence. In the past two decades, postconviction DNA statutes have been
adopted in every state,293 and some of these statutes include a provision for
appointing defense counsel.294 The options for falsely convicted defendants
who lack DNA evidence are much more limited.295 Legislative and court
remedies recognizing non-DNA-based new evidence of innocence provide
prosecutors with the legal mechanism to dismiss false convictions as well as
the institutional support to do so.
Defendants may introduce new evidence in a new trial motion, but most
states impose a statute of limitations ranging from a month to three years,
and as short as ten days from the entry of judgment. 296 In many states, after
the filing deadline for the new trial motion has passed, defendants cannot
present facts outside the court record until the postconviction stage, when
they will not be provided with counsel. In contrast, New York and New
Jersey allow inmates to challenge their conviction based on newly discovered
evidence at any time.297 Other states might follow suit and eliminate this
arbitrary statute of limitations. New evidence, such as the confession of an

perspective is that it provides a mechanism for introducing new evidence of innocence, and
new facts underlying claims of innocence-related error, into the direct appeal process.”).
292
See Primus, supra note 288, at 710 (summarizing and suggesting improvements upon
existing state structures for ineffective assistance of counsel claims).
293
See ACCESS TO POST-CONVICTION DNA TESTING, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
https://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/access-post-conviction-dna-testing/ [https://perma.
cc/2GAJ-9X6E] (“Today every state has enacted a post-conviction DNA statute because the
traditional appeals process was often insufficient for proving a wrongful conviction.”).
294
See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. ART. 64.01 (West 2017) https://www.innocen
ceproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/TX-CRIM-PRO-Art.-64.01-et-seq.-TX-pc-dna-a
md.-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/676S-G7FU] (“A convicted person is entitled to counsel
during a proceeding under this chapter. The convicting court shall appoint counsel for the
convicted person if the person informs the court that the person wishes to submit a motion
under this chapter, the court finds reasonable grounds for a motion to be filed, and the court
determines that the person is indigent.”).
295
See Medwed, supra note 38, at 658 (“Without a doubt, non-DNA cases are difficult
for defendants to overturn through state court proceedings given the subjectivity involved in
assessing most forms of new evidence and the absence of a method to prove innocence to a
scientific certainty.”).
296
See Brooks et al., supra note 31, at 1071.
297
See id. at 1074.
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alternate suspect, evidence concealed by police or prosecutors, or even a new
forensic discovery, may emerge at any time.
CONCLUSION
The postconviction stage, though often overlooked, serves a critical
function in criminal justice system processing as the final safeguard before
false convictions escape correction.
Prosecutors’ discretion empowers them to discover and dismiss false
convictions amidst a dearth of available options. Prosecutors’ offices that
have successfully facilitated an exoneration can serve as a model for other
jurisdictions of various sizes, caseloads, and resources. However, appellate
rules and workplace hierarchies can influence and constrain prosecutors’
postconviction efficacy. Both CIU and non-CIU offices faced challenges in
implementing objective postconviction review procedures. Therefore,
prosecutors’ efforts should still be supported through legal and legislative
reforms. In the absence of these reforms, prosecutors can facilitate
exonerations, but they are less likely to discover false convictions. Future
legal research may consider, holistically, the complementary functions of
prosecutorial review and judicial review to provide a late stage safeguard
against false convictions. By analyzing the interconnection between
prosecutors, courts, and legislative decisions, researchers may identify how
best to direct reform solutions.

